Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption (Chapter Report, 03/30/99, GAO/GGD-99-31). Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service's efforts to address employee corruption on the Southwest Border, focusing on: (1) the extent to which INS and Customs have and comply with policies and procedures for ensuring employee integrity; (2) identifying and comparing the Department of Justice's (DOJ) and Department of the Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related employee misconduct and whether the policies and procedures are followed; (3) the types of illegal drug-related activities in which INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have been involved; and (4) the extent to which lessons learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes in policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related corruption of INS and Customs employees. GAO noted that: (1) both INS and Customs have policies and procedures designed to ensure the integrity of their employees; (2) however, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to fully address the increased threat of employee corruption on the Southwest Border; (3) these policies and procedures consist mainly of mandatory background investigations for new staff and 5-year reinvestigations of employees, as well as basic integrity training; (4) while the agencies generally completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the job, as required, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some instances, by as many as 3 years; (5) both INS and Customs said the basic training that new employees are to receive includes integrity training; (6) agency records for 284 of 301 randomly selected INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border showed that they received several hours of integrity training as part of their basic training; (7) DOJ and Treasury have different organizational structures but similar policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs employees; (8) DOJ's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is generally responsible for investigating criminal allegations against INS employees; (9) GAO found that the Justice OIG generally complies with its policies and procedures; (10) at the Treasury, Customs' Office of Internal Affairs is generally responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal allegations against Customs employees; (11) GAO could not assess Customs' compliance with its procedures because its automated case management system and case files did not provide the necessary information; (12) some INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have engaged in a variety of illegal drug-related activities; (13) INS and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and change their policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related corruption of their employees; (14) the Justice OIG and Customs' Internal Affairs Office are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases, but have not done so; and (15) GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees assigned to the Southwest Border, who were convicted of drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992-1997, revealed internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported or corrected. --------------------------- Indexing Terms ----------------------------- REPORTNUM: GGD-99-31 TITLE: Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption DATE: 03/30/99 SUBJECT: Smuggling Drug trafficking Internal controls Federal employees Personnel management Customs administration Ethical conduct Bribery ****************************************************************** ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a ** ** GAO report. 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For further details, please ** ** send an e-mail message to: ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** with the message 'info' in the body. ** ****************************************************************** gg99031 DRUG CONTROL INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug- Related Employee Corruption United States General Accounting Office GAO Report to the Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control March 1999 GAO/GGD-99-31 March 1999 GAO/GGD-99-31 United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548 General Government Division B-279226 Page 1 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control GAO March 30, 1999 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control United States Senate Dear Mr. Chairman: The corruption of some INS and Customs employees along the Southwest Border by persons involved in the drug trade is a serious and continuing threat. The enormous sums of money being generated by drug trafficking have increased the threat for bribery. It is a challenge that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the U. S. Customs Service, and other law enforcement agencies must overcome at the border. This report responds to your request that we review INS' and Customs' efforts to address employee corruption on the Southwest Border. As agreed with you, our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which INS and Customs have and comply with policies and procedures for ensuring employee integrity; (2) identify and compare the Departments of Justice's and the Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for handling allegations of drug- related employee misconduct and determine whether the policies and procedures are followed; (3) identify the types of illegal drug- related activities in which INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have been involved; and (4) determine the extent to which lessons learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes in policies and procedures for preventing the drug- related corruption of INS and Customs employees. Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures designed to ensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to fully address the increased threat of employee corruption on the Southwest Border. These policies and procedures consist mainly of mandatory background investigations for new staff and 5- year reinvestigations of employees, as well as basic integrity training. While the agencies generally completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the job, as required, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some instances, by as many as 3 years. Both INS and Customs said the basic training that new employees are to receive includes integrity training. Agency records for 284 of 301 randomly Results in Brief B-279286 Page 2 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control selected INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border showed that they received several hours of integrity training as part of their basic training. The Departments of Justice and the Treasury have different organizational structures but similar policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug- related misconduct by INS and Customs employees. At Justice, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is generally responsible for investigating criminal allegations against INS employees. We found that the Justice OIG generally complied with its policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug- related misconduct. At the Treasury, Customs' Office of Internal Affairs is generally responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal allegations against Customs employees. We could not assess Customs' compliance with its procedures for handling allegations of drug- related misconduct because its automated case management system and its investigative case files did not provide the necessary information. Some INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have engaged in a variety of illegal drug- related activities, including waving drug loads through ports of entry, coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border, transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, selling drugs, and disclosing drug intelligence information. INS and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and change their policies and procedures for preventing the drug- related corruption of their employees. The Justice OIG and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases, but have not done so. Our review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees assigned to the Southwest Border, who were convicted of drug- related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997, revealed internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported and/ or corrected. 1 These weaknesses included instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the inspection lane at a port of entry, (2) INS and Customs employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting individuals with whom they had close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel were allowed to cross the Southwest Border or pass Border Patrol checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs had not formally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness. For example, we determined that financial information 1 In this report, if employees entered guilty pleas, we considered them to have been convicted of the crime. B-279286 Page 3 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control required for background investigations and reinvestigations was either limited or not fully reviewed. Stretching 1,962 miles from Brownsville, TX, to Imperial Beach, CA, the Southwest Border has been a long- standing transit area for illegal drugs entering the United States. According to the Department of State, the Southwest Border is the principal transit route for cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine entering the United States. INS and Customs are principally responsible for stopping and seizing illegal drug shipments across the Southwest Border. At the ports of entry, about 1,300 INS and 2, 000 Customs inspectors are to check incoming traffic to identify both persons and contraband that are not allowed to enter the country. Between the ports of entry and along thoroughfares in border areas, about 6,300 INS Border Patrol agents are to detect and prevent the illegal entry of persons and contraband. The corruption of INS or Customs employees is not a new phenomenon, and the 1990s have seen congressional emphasis on ensuring employee integrity and preventing corruption. 2 A corrupt INS or Customs employee at or between the ports of entry can help facilitate the safe passage of illegal drug shipments. The integrity policies and procedures adopted by INS and Customs are designed to ensure that their employees, especially those in positions that could affect the smuggling of illegal drugs into the United States, are of acceptable integrity and, failing that, to detect any corruption as quickly as possible. Our report objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which INS and Customs have and comply with policies and procedures for ensuring employee integrity; (2) identify and compare the Departments of Justice's and the Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for handling allegations of drug- related employee misconduct and determine whether the policies and procedures are followed; (3) identify the types of illegal drug- related activities in which INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have been involved; and (4) determine the extent to which lessons learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes in policies and procedures for preventing the drug- related corruption of INS and Customs employees. 2 During the 1970s, the Justice Department conducted a comprehensive investigation of corruption in INS called Operation Clean Sweep. During the 1990s, the Customs Service's Blue Ribbon Panel reviewed corruption on the Southwest Border. Background Objectives, Scope, and Methodology B-279286 Page 4 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control We did our review in Washington, D. C., at the Department of Justice's OIG, INS' Office of Internal Audit, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the Department of the Treasury's Customs Service, Office of Internal Affairs, and OIG. We also visited and/ or obtained data from several offices with Southwest Border responsibilities, including the El Paso and San Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA, and Phoenix, AZ; INS district offices; the El Paso, Laredo, TX, and San Diego Border Patrol Sector offices; the Customs Management Centers (CMC) in El Paso, Laredo, San Diego, and Tucson, AZ; and Justice OIG offices in El Paso, McAllen, TX, Tucson, and San Diego. To answer these objectives, we used various methods. We (1) interviewed appropriate agency officials, (2) reviewed documents containing relevant policies and procedures, (3) reviewed training information for selected INS and Customs employees in the above locations, (4) analyzed computerized personnel data on background investigations and reinvestigations of selected inspectors and agents in the above locations, (5) conducted structured file reviews of drug- related allegation cases, and (6) reviewed the case files for all INS and Customs Southwest Border employees who were convicted of drug- related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997. For a more detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology, see appendix I. We performed our work from January through November 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We requested written comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury. Comments from Justice, Justice OIG, and Customs are summarized at the end of this letter and are contained in appendixes VI, VII, and VIII. While both INS and Customs had various integrity- related procedures in place, their compliance with these procedures varied. Like Justice's and Treasury's other federal law enforcement agencies, both INS and Customs seek to ensure the integrity of their personnel by conducting background investigations and reinvestigations and requiring employees to undergo basic integrity training. Both INS and Customs completed nearly all background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the job, as required. However, reinvestigations required at 5- year intervals were typically overdue, in some cases, by as many as 3 years. For the employee files that we reviewed, INS and Customs generally complied with procedures requiring new employees to receive basic integrity training. Integrity training requirements vary among Justice and Treasury agencies. For example, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration INS' And Customs' Compliance With Their Integrity Procedures Varied B-279286 Page 5 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control (DEA), and the Secret Service require employees to receive basic and advanced 3 integrity training. INS and Customs provide basic and advanced integrity training but do not require employees to take the advanced training. According to the Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials, advanced integrity training reinforces the integrity concepts presented during basic training. However, over two- thirds of the INS and almost onequarter of the Customs employees on the Southwest Border with anti- drug smuggling responsibilities that we sampled did not elect to take advanced integrity training during the almost 2 -year period we examined. None of the five law enforcement agencies required all of their field agents to file annual financial disclosure statements or to relocate periodically for integrity assurance purposes. See appendix II for a comparison of the integrity requirements for INS, Customs, and other selected law enforcement agencies' field agents. INS and Customs follow Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations, which require background investigations to be completed for new hires by the end of their first year on the job. Contractors performed the investigations on behalf of INS and Customs, who made the final determinations on suitability. Prospective employees provided background information and authorization to obtain personal information to conduct the investigation. Generally, the background investigations included a credit check, criminal record check, contact with prior employers and personal references, and an interview with the prospective employee. Our review found that background investigations for over 99 percent of the immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors hired during the first half of fiscal year 1997 were completed by the end of their first year on the job. 4 OPM also requires immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors to be reinvestigated at 5- year intervals from the date they enter on duty. The objective of these reinvestigations is to ensure these employees' continuing suitability for their positions. As with background investigations, contractors did the reinvestigations and INS 3 For this report, advanced integrity training is any nonmanagerial integrity training provided to employees following their completion of basic training. 4 We restricted our analysis of immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents hired in fiscal year 1997 to those hired by March 8, 1997, and of Customs inspectors hired in fiscal year 1997 to those hired by March 25, 1997. This is because we received personnel data current as of March 1998, the 1- year anniversaries of those dates, and because OPM allows agencies to employ individuals in a subject to investigation status for up to 1 year. A background investigation should be completed during that time. INS and Customs Generally Completed Background Investigations For New Hires On Time INS and Customs Did Not Complete Most Reinvestigations When Due B-279286 Page 6 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control and Customs were responsible for making the final determinations on suitability. However, as shown in table 1, INS and Customs did not complete reinvestigations within the required 5- year time frame for over three- fourths of the selected Southwest Border personnel scheduled for reinvestigations in fiscal years 1995 through 1997. In many instances, reinvestigations were more than 3 years overdue. To the extent that a reinvestigation constitutes an important periodic check on an employee's continuing suitability for employment in a position where he or she may be exposed to bribery or other types of corruption, the continuing reinvestigation backlogs at both agencies leave them more vulnerable to potential employee corruption. Reinvestigations Completed when due Not completed when due Agency Required to be completed a Number Percent Number Percent Needing to be completed as of March 1998 INS 1, 218 280 23 938 77 513 Customs 782 161 21 621 79 421 a Includes reinvestigations due in fiscal years 1995 through 1997. See appendix V for further detail on INS and Customs reinvestigations. Source: GAO analysis of INS and Customs Service data. As of March 1998, INS had not yet completed 513 overdue reinvestigations of immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents. According to the Justice OIG, INS' reinvestigation backlog has been a continuing concern, and its neglect of reinvestigations is historic. In a September 1995 report, the Justice OIG noted that INS performed reinvestigations principally on individuals with access to national security information. Generally, this excluded INS inspectors and Border Patrol agents from reinvestigation. As of March 1998, Customs had a backlog of 421 overdue reinvestigations. According to a Customs official, several factors contributed to this backlog. First, when reinvestigations are scheduled, employees are required to complete and return the forms needed to initiate the reinvestigation to the Office of Internal Affairs. However, the official said that inspectors had been lax in returning required information to allow the reinvestigations to proceed. According to another Customs official, Customs has revised its procedure for initiating reinvestigations to require concurrent notification of employees and their managers so that managers can help ensure timely responses. Second, in 1989 and 1992, respectively, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) legally challenged Customs' designation of sensitive positions requiring reinvestigation and Table1: INS and Customs Compliance With the 5- year Reinvestigation Requirement for Selected Southwest Border Personnel as of March 1998 B-279286 Page 7 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control the need for some medical, financial, or drug- related information from certain employees. According to Customs and NTEU officials, the litigation led Customs to temporarily suspend reinvestigations. Third, Customs officials told us that they had insufficient staff to complete the reinvestigations on time. Newly hired immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors are required to attend basic training. As part of their basic training, new employees are to receive training courses on integrity concepts and expected behavior, including ethical concepts and values, ethical dilemmas and decisionmaking, and employee conduct expectations. This integrity training provides the only required integrity training for all immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors. For Border Patrol agents, 7 of 744 basic training hours are devoted to integrity training. For Customs inspectors, 8 of 440 basic training hours are devoted to integrity training. INS immigration inspectors are to receive integrity training as part of their basic training, but it is interspersed with other training rather than provided as a separate course. Therefore, we could not determine how many hours are devoted specifically to integrity training. We selected random samples of 100 immigration inspectors, 101 Border Patrol agents, and 100 Customs inspectors to determine whether they received integrity training as part of their basic training. Agency records we reviewed showed that 95 of 100 immigration inspectors, all 101 Border Patrol agents, and 88 of 100 Customs inspectors had received basic training. According to INS and Customs officials, the remaining employees likely received basic training, but it was not documented in their records. Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials advocated advanced integrity training for their employees to reinforce the integrity concepts presented during basic training. The Justice OIG, INS' Office of Internal Audit, and Customs provide advanced integrity training for INS and Customs employees. For example, according to officials from the Justice OIG, advanced integrity awareness training was provided to 2,552 INS employees in fiscal year 1997. In addition, officials from INS' Office of Internal Audit said that since 1995, they have provided advanced integrity training to over 3,000 INS employees on the Southwest Border. According to Customs officials, between 1996 and 1998, over 5,000 Customs employees received advanced integrity training. While this advanced training has been available to immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors, they were not required to INS and Customs Require Basic Integrity Training and Advocate Advanced Training Justice OIG, INS, and Customs Provide Advanced Integrity Training B-279286 Page 8 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control take it nor any additional integrity training beyond what they received in basic training. Consequently, some immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors assigned to the Southwest Border had not received any advanced integrity training in over 2 years. Based on random samples of immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors assigned to the Southwest Border, we found that during fiscal years 1995 through 1997, 60 of 100 immigration inspectors and 60 of 76 Border Patrol agents received no advanced integrity training during the almost 2 year period we examined. 5 The Customs sample showed that 24 of 100 Customs inspectors received no advanced integrity training during this period. Thus, the agencies missed an opportunity to reinforce integrity concepts with some of their employees. The Departments of Justice and Treasury have established procedures for handling allegations of employee misconduct. The Department of Justice's OIG is generally responsible for investigating criminal allegations against all INS employees, as well as noncriminal allegations against INS employees above the GS- 14 level. INS' Office of Internal Audit is generally responsible for investigating noncriminal allegations involving employees at the GS- 14 level and below, as well as any allegations that have been reviewed and referred by the Justice OIG. In the Department of the Treasury, Customs' Office of Internal Affairs is responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal misconduct allegations against Customs employees through the GS- 14 level. Treasury's OIG is responsible for investigating criminal and noncriminal allegations against higher- level Customs officials and all Office of Internal Affairs staff. The Justice OIG and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs have formal procedures for handling employee misconduct allegations. The areas covered by the procedures include (1) reporting suspected misconduct, (2) monitoring progress in the handling of allegations, (3) ensuring that allegations receive an appropriate level of attention, (4) conducting investigations, and (5) pursuing employee misconduct to an appropriate prosecutorial or administrative end. Misconduct allegations arise from numerous sources, including confidential informants, cooperating witnesses, anonymous tipsters, and 5 INS did not provide us with requested training data for 25 of the 101 Border Patrol agents in our sample. Justice OIG And INS Generally Complied With Investigative Procedures, But Customs' Compliance Was Uncertain B-279286 Page 9 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control whistle- blowers. For example, whistle- blowers can report alleged misconduct through the agencies' procedures for reporting any suspected wrongdoing. INS and Customs have policies that require employees to report suspected wrongdoing. If an employee alleges retaliation, he or she is referred to the Office of Special Counsel, which has specific legislative responsibility for handling retaliation cases. Information on the funding, staffing, and the number of allegations received by the Justice OIG, INS' Office of Internal Audit, the Treasury OIG, and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs during fiscal years 1995 through 1997 is presented in appendix III. In a majority of the cases we reviewed, the Justice OIG complied with its procedures for receiving, investigating, and resolving drug- related employee misconduct allegations. To determine compliance with investigative procedures, we randomly selected 72 of 91 cases alleging drug- related misconduct by INS employees on the Southwest Border that were opened and closed by the Justice OIG during fiscal year 1997. We selected five Justice OIG procedures to evaluate compliance with the processing of employee misconduct allegations. As shown in table 2, for example, monthly interim reports were prepared as required in 28 of 39 opened cases. In the remaining 11 cases, either some interim reports were missing or there were no interim reports in the case files. INS' Office of Internal Audit complied with its procedures for receiving and resolving employee misconduct allegations in all of its cases. We reviewed all 37 allegations involving INS Southwest Border employees opened and closed by INS' Office of Internal Audit during fiscal year 1997. We identified five processing steps that apply to allegation processing by INS' Office of Internal Audit and determined if the 37 cases complied with applicable requirements. As shown in table 2, all 37 allegations were entered into an automated, centralized database and were evaluated for investigation, referred to local management, or referred to the Justice OIG. Justice OIG and INS Office of Internal Audit Generally Complied With Their Investigative Procedures B-279286 Page 10 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Compliance (number of cases) Description of procedure Number of sample cases Yes No Could not determine a Justice OIG: 1. The allegation was entered into an automated, centralized database. 72 72 2. The allegation was evaluated for investigation, referred to INS, or closed without referral. 72 72 3. The monthly memoranda of investigative activity were prepared. 39 28 9 2 4. The final investigation report was completed and reviewed. 39 36 3 5. The final investigation report was sent to INS for action and/ or review. 3 3 INS Office of Internal Audit: 1. The allegation was entered into an automated, centralized database. 37 37 2. The allegation was evaluated for investigation, referred to local management, or referred to the Justice OIG. 37 37 3. An investigation was initiated by INS and completed within the required time period. None 4. A report was sent to the appropriate local management official when investigation supported administrative action, and a response was received within the required time period. None 5. INS determined whether the investigated case involved systemic weaknesses. None a Information needed to determine compliance was not in the case file. Source: GAO review of Justice OIG and INS Office of Internal Audit data. Because Customs' Office of Internal Affairs' automated case management system did not track adherence to Customs' processing requirements, we could not readily determine if the Office of Internal Affairs staff complied with their investigative procedures. Table 2: Compliance With Selected Procedures for a Sample of Allegations Involving INS Southwest Border Employees, Opened and Closed During Fiscal Year 1997 by Justice OIG or INS' Office of Internal Audit Customs' Compliance With Investigative Processing Procedures Is Uncertain B-279286 Page 11 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Customs' automated system is the official investigative record. It tracks and categorizes misconduct allegations and resulting investigations and disciplinary action. The investigative case files are to support the automated system in tracking criminal investigative activity and contain such information as printed records from the automated system, copies of subpoenas and arrest warrants, and a chronology of investigative events. Based on these content criteria and our file reviews, the investigative case files are not intended to and generally do not document the adherence to processing procedures. We selected 10 Office of Internal Affairs' procedures to evaluate their compliance with the processing of employee misconduct allegations. For example, the procedures require that allegations be recorded in the automated system as soon as feasible and approved by three supervisors, including a headquarters manager, within specified time frames. We randomly selected 51 of the 71 drug- related cases involving Customs Southwest Border employees that were opened and closed in fiscal year 1997 to determine if the Office of Internal Affairs complied with the 10 procedures. As shown in table 3, the files did not contain any data to enable us to determine whether the Office of Internal Affairs complied with six procedures. For three procedures, the Office of Internal Affairs complied with the requirements for all cases. For the remaining procedure, the Office of Internal Affairs complied for two- thirds of the cases. Compliance (number of cases) Description of procedures Number of applicable cases Yes No Could not determine a 1. The allegation was entered into an automated, centralized database within the required time period. 51 34 17 2. Field supervisors and the responsible headquarters manager approved entry of the allegation into the automated system for tracking. 51 51 3. The alleged wrongdoing and the viability of investigative leads were assessed. 51 51 4. The allegation was categorized on the basis of its severity. 51 51 5. Specific criteria were considered in determining whether the allegation warranted formal investigation. 51 51 6. The allegation was approved for formal investigation. 2 2 7. Field supervisors conducted periodic reviews. 2 2 Table 3: Compliance With Selected Procedures for a Sample of Allegations Involving Customs Southwest Border Employees, Opened and Closed During Fiscal Year 1997 by Customs' Office of Internal Affairs B-279286 Page 12 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Compliance (number of cases) Description of procedures Number of applicable cases Yes No Could not determine a 8. A final investigation report was prepared within the required time period. 2 2 9. Management was notified of the investigation's completion and that action was required. 2 2 10. Management notified the investigated employee of the action to be taken within the required time period. 2 2 a Information was not available in the automated system or the case file. Source: GAO review of Customs data. Despite INS and Customs integrity procedures to prevent drug- related corruption, 28 INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border were convicted for drug- related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997. By definition, these cases represented a failure of the procedures in place to prevent drug- related corruption. These cases also represented an opportunity to identify internal control weaknesses and to improve agency integrity procedures. However, the Justice OIG and Customs did not take advantage of the opportunity to learn lessons from these cases. Our analysis of the 28 cases identified several weaknesses in internal controls and integrity procedures. Appendix IV provides a summary of each of the 28 cases we reviewed. Our analysis of the 28 closed cases revealed that drug- related corruption in these cases is not restricted to any one type, location, agency, or job. Corruption occurred in many locations and under various circumstances and times, underscoring the need for comprehensive integrity procedures that are effective. The 28 INS and Customs employees engaged in one or more drug- related criminal activities including waving drug- laden vehicles through ports of entry, coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border, transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, selling drugs, and disclosing drug intelligence information. Opportunities to Learn Lessons From Closed Corruption Cases Have Been Missed Convicted INS and Customs Employees Had Varied Employment Histories B-279286 Page 13 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control The 28 convicted employees (19 INS employees and 9 Customs employees) were stationed at various locations on the Southwest Border. Six each were stationed in El Paso, TX, and Calexico, CA; four were stationed in Douglas, AZ; three were stationed in San Ysidro, CA; two each were stationed in Hidalgo, TX, and Los Fresnos, TX; and one each was stationed in Naco, AZ, Chula Vista, CA, Bayview, TX, Harlingen, TX, and Falfurrias, TX. Source: GAO review of INS, Justice OIG, FBI, and Customs files. The 28 INS and Customs employees who were convicted for drug- related crimes included 10 immigration inspectors, 7 Customs inspectors, 6 Border Patrol agents, 3 INS Detention Enforcement Officers (DEO), 1 Customs canine enforcement officer, and 1 Customs operational analysis specialist. All but three of these employees had anti- drug smuggling responsibilities. Twenty- six of the convicted employees were men; two were women. As Figure 1: Southwest Border Duty Stations of INS and Customs Employees Who Were Convicted for Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992 Through 1997. B-279286 Page 14 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control shown in table 4, the employment histories of the convicted employees varied substantially. Range Selected data Low High Average Age at termination 26 56 38 Years with agency 1 21 10 Years at last duty station 1 15 7 Source: INS, Justice OIG, Customs, and FBI data. In 19 cases, the employees acted alone, that is, no other INS or Customs employees were involved in the drug- related criminal activity. In the remaining nine cases, two or more INS and/ or Customs employees acted together. Of the 28 cases, 23 originated from information provided by confidential informants or cooperating witnesses, and 5 cases originated from information provided by agency whistle- blowers. Prison sentences for the convicted employees ranged from 30 days, for disclosure of confidential information, to life imprisonment for drug conspiracy, money laundering, and bribery. The average sentence was about 10 years. 6 Both the Justice OIG and Customs procedures require them to formally report internal control weaknesses identified during investigations, including drug- related corruption investigations involving INS and Customs employees. Generally, the Justice OIG and Customs Office of Internal Affairs, respectively, have lead responsibility for investigating criminal allegations involving INS and Customs employees. Reports of internal control weaknesses are to identify any lessons to be learned that can be used to prevent further employee corruption. The reports are to be forwarded to agency officials who are responsible for taking corrective action. Reports are not required if no internal control weaknesses are identified. In the 28 cases involving INS or Customs employees who were convicted for drug- related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997, no reports were prepared. We are left to conclude from this that either (1) there were no internal control weaknesses revealed by, or lessons to be learned from, these corruption cases or (2) opportunities to identify and correct internal control weaknesses have been missed, and thus, INS' and Customs' vulnerability to employee corruption has not been reduced. 6 The average prison sentence calculation does not include two former employees sentenced to life imprisonment, and one former employee who fled the country prior to sentencing. Information is provided only on the imprisonment portion of the sentences. Table 4: Selected Employment Data on INS and Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992 Through 1997 Drug- Related Corruption Cases Were Not Used To Learn Lessons B-279286 Page 15 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Justice's OIG investigated 13 of the 28 cases. The investigative files did not document if procedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses. Further, there were no reports identifying internal control weaknesses. According to a Justice OIG official, no reports are required if no weaknesses are identified, and he could not determine why reports were not prepared in these cases. Customs' Office of Internal Affairs' Internal Affairs Handbook provides for the preparation of a procedural deficiency report in those internal investigations where there was a significant failure that resulted from (1) failure to follow an established procedure, (2) lack of an established procedure, or (3) conflicting or obsolete procedures. The report is to detail the causal factors and scope of the deficiency. The appropriate Customs manager is to be charged with developing and implementing the corrective procedures, and the Management Inspections Division is to track the corrective procedures and coordinate with the appropriate manager to ensure continuing compliance. We identified eight cases involving Customs employees investigated by Customs' Office of Internal Affairs. No procedural deficiency reports were prepared in these cases. Further, the investigative files did not document whether internal control weaknesses were identified. A Customs official said the reports are generally not prepared. Although the Justice OIG and Customs Office of Internal Affairs have lead responsibility for investigating allegations involving INS and Customs employees, the FBI is authorized to investigate INS or Customs employees. Of the 28 cases, the FBI investigated 7 involving 6 INS employees and 1 Customs employee. Under current procedures, the FBI is not required to provide the Justice OIG or Customs Office of Internal Affairs with case information that would allow them to identify internal control weaknesses, where the FBI investigation involves an INS or Customs employee. In addition, while Attorney General memorandums require the FBI to identify and report any internal control weaknesses identified during white- collar or health care fraud investigations, a Justice Department official told us that these reporting requirements do not apply to drug- related corruption cases. According to FBI officials, no reports were prepared in the seven cases because they were not required. B-279286 Page 16 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control The Justice OIG and Customs did not identify and report any internal control weaknesses involving the procedures that were followed at the ports of entry and at Border Patrol checkpoints along the Southwest Border. Our review of the same cases identified several weaknesses. We identified 14 cases in which INS or Customs inspectors knowingly passed drug- laden vehicles through ports of entry. Traditionally, INS and Customs have relied on internal controls to minimize this type of corruption. These have included the random assignment and shifting of inspectors from one lane to another and the unannounced inspection of a group of vehicles. However, in the cases we reviewed, these internal controls did not prevent corrupt INS and Customs personnel from allowing drug- laden vehicles to enter the United States. In some cases, the inspectors communicated their lane assignment and the time they would be on duty to the drug smuggler, and in other cases, they did not. In one case, for example, an inspector used a cellular telephone to send a prearranged code to a drug smuggler's beeper to tell him which lane to use and what time to use it. In contrast, another inspector did not notify the drug smuggler concerning his lane assignment or the times he would be on duty. In that case, the drug smuggler used an individual, referred to as a spotter, to conduct surveillance of the port of entry. The spotter used a cellular telephone to contact the driver of the drug- laden vehicle to tell him which lane to drive through. The drug smugglers' schemes succeeded in these cases because the drivers of the drug- laden vehicles could choose the lane they wanted to use for inspection purposes. These cases support the implementation of one or more methods to deprive drivers of their choice of inspection lanes at ports of entry. At the time of our review, Customs was testing a method to assign drivers to inspection lanes at ports of entry. In 10 of 28 cases, drug smugglers relied on friendships, personal relationships, or symbols of law enforcement authority to move drug loads through a port of entry or past a Border Patrol checkpoint. In these 10 cases, drug smugglers believed that coworkers, relatives, and friends of Customs or immigration inspectors, or law enforcement officials, would not be inspected or would be given preferential treatment in the inspection process. For example, a Border Patrol agent relied on his friendships with his coworkers to avoid inspection at a Border Patrol checkpoint where he was stationed. In another case, an inspector agreed to allow her boyfriend to smuggle drugs through a port of entry. The boyfriend used his personal and intimate relationship with the inspector to solicit drug shipments from drug dealers. Two DEOs working together used INS detention buses and Our Review of Closed Corruption Cases Revealed Internal Control Weaknesses on the Southwest Border B-279286 Page 17 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control vans to transport drugs past a Border Patrol checkpoint. In two separate cases, former INS employees relied on friendships they had developed during their tenure with the agency to smuggle drugs through ports of entry and past Border Patrol checkpoints. INS and Customs do not have written recusal policies concerning the performance of inspections where the relationship of immigration or Customs inspectors and Border Patrol agents to the person being inspected is such that they may not objectively perform the inspection. Nor do they have a written inspection policy for law enforcement officers or their vehicles. For example, our review determined that on numerous occasions, INS DEOs drove INS vehicles with drug loads past Border Patrol checkpoints without being inspected. INS and Customs have not evaluated the effectiveness of their integrity assurance procedures to identify areas that could be improved. According to Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials, agency integrity procedures have not been evaluated to determine if they are effective. The Acting Deputy Commissioner of Customs said that there were no evaluations of the effectiveness of Customs integrity procedures. Similarly, officials in INS' Offices of Internal Audit and Personnel Security said that there are no evaluations of the effectiveness of INS' integrity procedures. According to the Justice Inspector General, virtually no work had been done to review closed corruption cases or interview convicted employees to identify areas of vulnerability. Based on our review, one way to evaluate the effectiveness of agency integrity procedures would be to use drug- related investigative case information. For example, the objective of background investigations or reinvestigations is to determine an individual's suitability for employment, including whether he or she has the required integrity. All 28 of the INS and Customs employees who were convicted for drug- related crimes received background investigations or reinvestigations that determined they were suitable. According to INS and Customs security officials, financial information, required to be provided by employees as part of their background investigations or reinvestigations, is to be used to determine whether they appear to be living beyond their means, or have unsatisfied debts. If either of these issues arises, it must be satisfactorily resolved before INS or Customs can determine that the employee is suitable. In addition, Justice policy provides for the temporary removal of INS and Customs Have Not Evaluated Their Integrity Procedures B-279286 Page 18 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents if they are unable and/ or unwilling to satisfy their debts. 7 Our review of background investigation and reinvestigation files for convicted INS employees showed that immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents were required to provide limited financial information on liabilities, including bankruptcies, wage garnishment, property repossession, and liens for taxes or other debts or judgements that have not been paid. 8 They were not required to provide information on their assets. In comparison, Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers were required to provide information on both their assets and liabilities, including financial information for themselves and their immediate families on their bank accounts, automobiles, real estate, securities, safe deposit boxes, business investments, art, boats, antiques, inheritance, mortgage, and debts and obligations exceeding $200. 9 Our review of the 28 cases involving convicted INS and Customs employees disclosed that 26 of 28 employees were offered or received financial remuneration for their illegal acts. At least two were substantially indebted, and at least four were shown to be living beyond their means. For example, one of the closed cases we reviewed involved an immigration inspector who said he became involved with a drug smuggler because he had substantial credit card debt and was on the verge of bankruptcy. Given the limited financial information immigration inspectors are required to provide, this inspector might not have been identified as a potential risk. In another case, a GS- 12 Border Patrol agent owned a house valued at approximately $200,000, an Olympic- sized swimming pool in its own separate building, a 5- car garage, 5 automobiles, 1 van, 2 boats, approximately 100 weapons, $45,000 in treasury bills, 40 acres of land, and had no debt. Given the current background investigation or reinvestigation financial reporting requirements for Border Patrol agents, this agent would not have had anything to report, since he was not required to report his assets, and he had no debts to report. 7 Justice Department policy defines debt as lawful financial obligations that are just debts that are past due. 8 Immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents are to complete a Questionnaire for National Security Positions as part of their background investigation and reinvestigation. 9 Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers are to complete a Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions and a Financial Statement on Customs Form 257 as part of their background investigation and reinvestigation. B-279286 Page 19 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Our review of Customs files for eight of the nine convicted Customs employees showed that Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers completed financial disclosure statements that included their assets and liabilities as part of their employee background investigations and reinvestigations. However, based on our case file review, Customs does not fully use all of the financial information. For example, according to a Customs official, reported liabilities are to be compared with debts listed on a credit report to determine if all debts were reported. Thus, their current use of the reported financial information would not have helped to identify an employee who was living well beyond his means or whose debts were excessive. Another source of evaluative information for INS and Customs could be the experiences of other federal agencies with integrity prevention and detection policies and procedures. For example, while INS' and Customs' procedures were similar to those used by other federal law enforcement agencies, several differences exist. As shown in appendix II, according to agency officials, INS and Customs did not require advanced integrity training, polygraph examinations, or panel interviews before hiring, while the FBI, DEA, and Secret Service did have these requirements. Among the five agencies, only DEA required new employees to be assigned to a mentor to reinforce agency values and procedures. Since these policies and procedures are used by other agencies, INS and Customs may want to consider their applicability to their employees. During our review, the Justice OIG, INS, the Treasury OIG, and Customs began to review their anticorruption efforts. These efforts have not been completed, and it is too early to determine what their outcomes will be. In May 1998, the Justice OIG established a Research and Analysis Unit to identify critical management and enforcement issues, develop and implement strategies and/ or policy recommendations, and monitor and measure their impact. This unit's proposed projects include: (1) finding ways to strengthen the Justice OIG's role in controlling corruption on the Southwest Border and (2) developing a nationwide integrity awareness training program. In February 1998, INS' Office of Internal Audit created a Special Investigations and Projects Branch, which is responsible for (1) developing and implementing integrity training programs, (2) reviewing and analyzing cases in which INS employees are arrested or indicted on drug or other corruption charges, and (3) recommending corrective action, as needed. Outcomes of Recent AntiCorruption Efforts Are Unknown B-279286 Page 20 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control The Department of the Treasury has established an Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) that was tasked with conducting a comprehensive review of integrity issues related to the potential vulnerability of Customs to corruption and to analyze the efficacy of departmental and bureau internal affairs systems. 10 According to a Treasury OPR official, these efforts are intended to identify weaknesses and to help prevent the corruption of Customs employees. Within Customs, at the time of our review, the Acting Deputy Commissioner of Customs was heading a task force to develop an Integrity Awareness Program. This task force included representatives from several offices, including those of Field Operations, Human Resources, and Internal Affairs. The Office of Internal Affairs had initiated an Integrity Indicator Research Program that is to provide a capability to identify human behavioral indicators of integrity characteristics to prevent and investigate propensities for misconduct and corruption. One of the intended benefits of this effort is to improve policies and procedures. The Office of Field Operations has initiated an Officer Integrity Project whose goal is to develop policies and processes that prevent corruption. These initiatives, aimed at improving integrity programs, are steps in the right direction. However, it is too early to tell what their outcomes will be and how well they will address shortcomings in both agencies' internal control procedures for preventing employee corruption. Given the enormous sums of money being generated by drug trafficking, the corruption of some INS and Customs employees along the Southwest Border is a serious and continuing threat. Both INS and Customs are vulnerable to this threat. This situation exists, in part, because neither INS nor Customs has fully availed itself of opportunities to better ensure the integrity of its employees. Neither agency has (1) completed evaluation of its policies and procedures to determine what works and what improvements are needed, (2) fully complied with its integrity policies and procedures, or (3) identified and corrected internal control weaknesses that surfaced during past corruption episodes. As a result, neither agency can be sure that adequate internal controls are in place to detect and prevent employee corruption. 10 An Assessment of Vulnerabilities to Corruption and Effectiveness of the Office of Internal Affairs, U. S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Under Secretary (Enforcement), Office of Professional Responsibility, February 1999. Conclusions B-279286 Page 21 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Neither the Justice OIG nor Customs Office of Internal Affairs documented that they used closed drug- related corruption cases to identify weaknesses and develop suitable internal controls. In addition, the FBI did not identify and report internal control weaknesses in the cases it investigated because it was not required to do so. Our review of closed drug- related corruption cases identified internal control weaknesses that allowed (1) drug smugglers to choose their inspection lanes at ports of entry; (2) law enforcement officers and their vehicles to pass uninspected through ports of entry and Border Patrol checkpoints; and (3) immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors to inspect individuals with whom they had close personal relationships. INS did not require immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents to fully report their assets and liabilities. Consequently, INS lacked financial information needed in background investigations and reinvestigations to identify individuals who may have been living beyond their means. Customs collected financial information including assets and liabilities from Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers as part of their background investigations and reinvestigations. However, Customs did not fully use the financial information to identify employees who appeared to be living beyond their means. We recommend that the Attorney General direct the Commissioner of INS to evaluate the effectiveness of integrity assurance efforts such as training, background investigations, and reinvestigations; require the Commissioner of INS to comply with policies that require employment reinvestigations to be completed when they are due; direct the Commissioner of INS to strengthen internal controls at Southwest Border ports of entry and at Border Patrol checkpoints by establishing (1) one or more methods to deprive drivers of their choice of inspection lanes at ports of entry; (2) a policy for the inspection of law enforcement officers or their vehicles at ports of entry and Border Patrol checkpoints; and (3) a recusal policy concerning the performance of inspections by immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents where their objectivity may be in question; direct the Commissioner of INS to require Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors to file financial disclosure statements, including a listing of their assets and liabilities, as part of the background investigation or reinvestigation process, as well as fully review this information to identify financial issues such as employees who appear to be living beyond their means; Recommendations B-279286 Page 22 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control require the Justice OIG to document that policies and procedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses in cases where an INS employee is determined to have engaged in drug- related criminal activities; and require the Director of the FBI to develop a procedure to provide information from closed FBI cases, involving INS or Customs employees, to the Justice OIG or Customs Office of Internal Affairs so they can identify and report internal control weaknesses to the responsible agency official. The procedure should only apply in those cases where (1) the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs were not involved in the investigation, (2) the subject of the investigation was an INS or Customs employee, and (3) the employee was convicted of a drug- related crime. We recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct the Commissioner of Customs to evaluate the effectiveness of integrity assurance efforts, including training, background investigations, and reinvestigations; require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with policies that require employment reinvestigations to be completed when they are due; require the Commissioner of Customs to document that policies and procedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses, in cases where a Customs employee is determined to have engaged in drugrelated criminal activities; direct the Commissioner of Customs to strengthen internal controls at Southwest Border ports of entry by establishing (1) one or more methods to deprive drivers of their choice of inspection lanes; (2) a policy for inspection of law enforcement officers and their vehicles; and (3) a recusal policy concerning the performance of inspections by Customs inspectors where their objectivity may be in question; and require that Customs fully review financial disclosure statements, which employees are required to provide as part of the background investigation or reinvestigation process, to identify financial issues such as employees who appear to be living beyond their means. The Department of Justice generally agreed with the substance of the report and recognized the importance of taking all possible actions to reduce the potential for corruption. However, Justice expressed reservations about implementing two of the six recommendations addressed to the Attorney General. Justice expressed reservations about implementing our recommendation that Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors file financial Agency Comments B-279286 Page 23 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control disclosure statements as part of their background investigations or reinvestigations. Specifically, it noted that implementing financial disclosure has obstacles to be met and at present the DOJ has limited data to suggest that they would provide better data or greater assurance of a person's integrity. The obstacles included obtaining Office of Management and Budget approval of a form, labor organization negotiations, and the potential need to develop financial verification procedures as part of background investigations and reinvestigations. Justice also cited Customs' experience with financial reporting and litigation involving the use of the financial disclosure reports. We recognize that implementation of this recommendation will require some administrative actions by INS. However, these actions are consistent with the routine management practices associated with making policy changes within the agency. Therefore, the obstacles do not appear to be inordinate or insurmountable. Concerning the limited data about the benefits of financial reporting, according to OPM officials and the adjudication manual for background investigations and reinvestigations, financial information can have a direct bearing and impact on determining an individual's integrity. The circumstances described in our case studies suggest that financial reporting could have raised issues for followup during a background investigation or reinvestigation. We recognize that there may be questions on the effectiveness of this procedure; therefore, this report contains a recommendation for an overall evaluation of INS' integrity assurance efforts. Customs' experience with the effectiveness of financial reporting may have been limited by their limited analysis of the data. In that regard, this report contains a recommendation that Customs make full use of the information they already collect. Concerning Customs litigation, financial reporting by Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers is not and has never been an issue in litigation, according to Customs officials and the President and Deputy General Counsel of the NTEU. Justice also expressed reservations about implementing our recommendation that the FBI develop a procedure to provide information to the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs on internal control weaknesses. Therefore, we clarified our recommendation to indicate that the procedure should only apply in those cases where (1) the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs were not involved in the investigation, (2) the subject of the investigation was an INS or Customs employee, and (3) the employee was convicted of a drug- related crime. If internal control weaknesses in INS or Customs are known to the FBI and B-279286 Page 24 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control not disclosed to those agencies, then the agencies are not in the best position to correct the abuses. Because there are potential sensitivity and liability issues involved in disclosing investigative case- related information, our recommendation gives the FBI the broadest possible latitude in determining how, when, and what information it will disclose for the purpose of identifying and correcting internal control weaknesses within INS or Customs. For example, the procedure could include, as appropriate: (1) referring the case for investigation to the Justice OIG, Customs Office of Internal Affairs, or one of the corruption task forces on the Southwest Border; (2) inviting the Justice OIG or Customs Office of Internal Affairs to participate in the investigation; or (3) preparing a report that identified the internal control weakness and providing it to the agency. According to FBI officials, it routinely and regularly shares investigative case information with the Justice OIG and Customs Office of Internal Affairs from cases investigated by corruption task forces. Therefore, our recommendation is within the realm of current FBI disclosure practices. Justice accepted our recommendation that INS evaluate the effectiveness of its integrity assurance efforts and indicated that a contractor was evaluating INS' integrity/ ethics training. However, Justice's response gave no indication that it intended to evaluate its background investigations or reinvestigations. INS needs to determine empirically for its integrity assurance efforts what works and how well. The evaluation should include an assessment of the extent to which each integrity procedure achieves the objectives of preventing or identifying drug- related corruption. For example, if an INS employee is convicted of a drug- related crime, INS should determine whether the convicted employee's background investigation or reinvestigation contributed to identifying the individual. Without such assessments, INS cannot ensure that its efforts are achieving their objectives of preventing or identifying drug- related corruption. Justice agreed with our recommendation that INS comply with policies to complete employment reinvestigations when they are due, and we believe that INS' recent efforts to eliminate its reinvestigations backlog are steps in the right direction. Once the backlog has been eliminated, INS should continue to monitor and ensure that they are done on time. Justice agreed with our recommendation that INS strengthen controls at Southwest Border ports of entry and Border Patrol checkpoints. However, the controls cited by INS do not appear fully responsive to our recommendation because the controls INS plans to implement do not B-279286 Page 25 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control deprive drivers of their choice of lanes at ports of entry. The cases we reviewed showed that corrupt inspectors and drug smugglers had developed numerous methods of bypassing existing internal controls, particularly those controls related to denying drug smugglers knowledge of the corrupt inspector's lane assignment and duty time. With this information, the drug smuggler could proceed directly to the corrupt inspector's lane and be passed without inspection. The Justice OIG agreed with our recommendation concerning the need to identify and document internal control weaknesses discovered during criminal investigations of INS employees. The Department of the Treasury provided comments from Customs that generally concurred with our recommendations and indicated that they are taking steps to implement them. However, Customs requested that we reconsider our recommendation that Customs fully review financial disclosure statements that are provided as part of the background and reinvestigation process. Customs indicated that implementing this recommendation may violate the provisions of the Computer Matching Act. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, P. L. 100- 503, generally requires that agencies engaging in computer matching must do so pursuant to written matching agreements that state such things as the purpose and legal authority of the match, the justification for the matching program, its anticipated results, a description of the records to be matched, as well as other information on the program. Our recommendation expects Customs to make more thorough examination of the financial information it collects to determine if employees appear to be living beyond their means. We leave it to Customs' discretion to determine the type of examination to be performed. Since implementing the recommendation does not require electronically matching financial disclosure information with other data, there is no violation of the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act. Justice's , Justice's OIG, and Customs' comments are provided in appendixes VI, VII, and VIII. We are sending copies of this report to The Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General; and The Honorable Robert Rubin, Secretary of the B-279286 Page 26 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Treasury. Copies will also be made available to others upon request. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX. Sincerely yours, Richard M. Stana Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues Page 27 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Page 28 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Contents 1 Letter Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 30 Appendix II: Mandatory Integrity Procedures for Selected INS, Customs, and Other Law Enforcement Agencies' Personnel 33 Appendix III: Resources and Workload Data For Selected Organizations 34 Appendix IV: Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 35 Appendix V: Completion of Employment Background Reinvestigations 44 Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Justice 45 Appendix VII: Comments From the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General 50 Appendix VIII: Comments From the Customs Service 52 Appendix IX: Major Contributors to This Report 63 Appendixes Table1: INS and Customs Compliance With the 5- year Reinvestigation Requirement for Selected Southwest Border Personnel as of March 1998 6 Table 2: Compliance With Selected Procedures for a Sample of Allegations Involving INS Southwest Border Employees, Opened and Closed During Fiscal Year 1997 by Justice OIG or INS' Office of Internal Audit 10 Table 3: Compliance With Selected Procedures for a Sample of Allegations Involving Customs Southwest Border Employees, Opened and Closed During Fiscal Year 1997 by Customs' Office of Internal Affairs 11 Table 4: Selected Employment Data on INS and Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992 Through 1997 14 Table II. 1: Mandatory Integrity Procedures for Selected INS, Customs, and Other Law Enforcement Agencies' Personnel as of June 1998 33 Tables Table III. 1: Resource and Workload Data for Selected Organizations Responsible for Investigating Alleged Wrongdoing by INS and Customs Employees, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1997 34 Contents Page 29 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Table V. 1: Completion of Employment Reinvestigations Due in Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1997 for Southwest Border Customs Inspectors, INS Immigration Inspectors, and INS Border Patrol Agents 44 Figure 1: Southwest Border Duty Stations of INS and Customs Employees Who Were Convicted for DrugRelated Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992 Through 1997. 13 Figures Abbreviations CMC Customs Management Center DEA Drug Enforcement Administration DEO Detention Enforcement Officer FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center INS Immigration and Naturalization Service NTEU National Treasury Employees Union OIG Office of the Inspector General OPM Office of Personnel Management OPR Office of Professional Responsiblity Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Page 30 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control In responding to your request, we adopted the following approach to meet the objectives agreed upon with your staff. We did our review at the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Office of Internal Audit, and at the Department of the Treasury's Customs Service, Office of Internal Affairs, and OIG in Washington, D. C; and at several Southwest Border locations. These included INS district offices in El Paso, San Antonio, San Diego, and Phoenix; Border Patrol Sector offices in El Paso, Laredo, San Diego, and Tucson; Customs Management Center offices (CMC) in El Paso, Laredo, San Diego, and Tucson; and Justice OIG offices in McAllen, TX, El Paso, Tucson, and San Diego. To determine the extent to which INS and Customs have and comply with their policies and procedures to ensure employee integrity, we reviewed and analyzed agency- provided documentary and testimonial evidence and interviewed appropriate officials on agency policies and procedures, ethics and integrity training, personnel rotation, background investigations, and investigating allegations of wrongdoing. We also obtained information from INS, Customs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Secret Service on their mandatory integrity procedures for selected field personnel. We took various steps to verify whether employees had received integrity training. We selected random samples of 201 INS and 100 Customs employees. Our samples included 25 employees each from 7 of the INS and the 4 Customs offices mentioned above and 26 employees from 1 of the INS offices. Due to increased hiring in INS and Customs, we stratified employee positions into two categories those who entered on duty during or prior to fiscal year 1997. For each of INS' and Customs' offices, we selected our samples based on the percentage of inspectors or Border Patrol agents in each category. We obtained information on whether they had received the required training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. For training provided at Customs' CMCs, INS districts, and INS Border Patrol sectors, we interviewed relevant officials and obtained policies on ethics and integrity training at each of the Southwest Border locations selected. To verify whether ethics and integrity training had actually occurred, we obtained training information for the above- mentioned random samples of INS and Customs inspectors and Border Patrol agents in each location. Concerning background investigations, we analyzed INS and Customs computerized data on the most recent background investigations completed as of March 1998 for all INS and Customs inspectors and Border Patrol agents at the Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Page 31 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control above Southwest Border locations. We analyzed these data to assess the extent to which policy requirements had been followed for initial background investigations when personnel entered on duty and for reinvestigations for personnel with sufficient years of service. We did not independently verify the accuracy of the computerized personnel data provided to us by INS and Customs to hard copy files. However, we did perform some limited analyses (e. g., checked whether there were duplicate entries for the same employees and whether the values for data variables seemed generally reasonable) to determine whether the data were reliable. To identify and compare the Departments of Justice's and the Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for handling allegations of drug- related employee misconduct and determine whether the policies and procedures are followed, we reviewed and analyzed applicable program information from the respective departments and/ or agencies and interviewed relevant agency officials. In addition, we reviewed random samples of drug- related allegations. These allegations were made about INS and Customs Southwest Border personnel and were opened and closed during fiscal year 1997 by the Justice OIG, INS' Office of Internal Audit, and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs. We allowed the agencies to define a drug- related allegation. We reviewed 72 of 91 allegations about INS employees handled by the Justice OIG, all 37 allegations opened and closed by INS' Office of Internal Audit, and 51 of 71 cases handled by Customs' Office of Internal Affairs. We developed structured data collection instruments and reviewed the case files to determine whether these organizations followed their policies and procedures. We relied on data from the agencies' official automated or hard copy case files that included processing information to determine compliance with processing requirements. To determine what types of illegal drug- related activities INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have been involved in, we identified employees who were convicted of drug- related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997. We were unable to identify a single source for this information. Therefore, we requested background information on previous corruption efforts in INS and Customs; performed a literature search; and requested the names of employees convicted of drug- related crimes from Customs' Office of Internal Affairs, Justice's OIG, the FBI, and the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section. From the information provided, we developed a consolidated list of these individuals. To be included, an individual had to have been (1) an INS or Customs employee during the Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Page 32 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control time he or she was determined to have engaged in criminal drug- related activity and (2) convicted of a drug- related crime between October 1, 1991, and September 30, 1997. We requested and reviewed investigative files, personnel files, and background investigation files for each individual in our study where they were available. INS could not locate one personnel file, and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had no record of a background investigation for two INS employees. Customs could not locate the background investigation file for one former employee. We collected the same information on each individual to determine the drug- related activities for which they were convicted. We also collected information on the methods used to carry out the illegal activities, their occupations, how their illegal activities were brought to the attention of investigative authorities, their lengths of agency service, their final duty stations, and the lengths of their prison sentences. We summarized the information from all of the cases. To determine the extent to which lessons learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes in policies and procedures for preventing the drug- related corruption of INS and Customs employees, we interviewed agency officials to identify what policies or procedures had been changed as a result of specific drug- related corruption cases. Agency procedures provide for the preparation of internal control weakness reports only if a weakness is identified during the criminal investigation. Because there were no reports that would have led to policy or procedural changes, we reviewed the agencies' investigative case files to determine if there were any internal control weaknesses that could have been identified from the cases involving convicted INS or Customs employees. We reviewed each case individually and then grouped cases that involved similar criminal activities and reviewed them for patterns that could identify weaknesses. Appendix II Mandatory Integrity Procedures for Selected INS, Customs, and Other Law Enforcement Agencies' Personnel Page 33 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Integrity procedures a INS Customs FBI DEA Secret Service Basic training X X X X X Advanced integrity training X X X Management integrity training X X X X X Background investigation X X X X X 5- year reinvestigation X X X X X Subscribe to the Federal Code of Conduct X X X X X Subscribe to the Federal Code of Ethics X X X X X Drug testing before hire X X X X X Random drug testing X X X X X Suitability or psychological testing X X X X Polygraph examination X X X Panel interview before hire b X X X Employee certification of understanding Standards of Conduct X X X X Whistle- blower procedures X X X X X Organization that receives and resolves allegations of employee wrongdoing X X X X X Proactive undercover operations X X Mentor program X a The selected personnel include DEA, FBI, and Secret Service special agents, INS' immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents, and Customs' inspectors and canine enforcement officers. b The requirement applies to Border Patrol agent job applicants, but not to immigration inspector job applicants. Source: INS, Customs, the FBI, DEA, and Secret Service information. Table II. 1: Mandatory Integrity Procedures for Selected INS, Customs, and Other Law Enforcement Agencies' Personnel as of June 1998 Appendix III Resources and Workload Data For Selected Organizations Page 34 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Fiscal Year Description 1997 1996 1995 Percent change from fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 1997 INS employees: Justice OIG Funding (in millions) $10.5 $10.4 $10.4 1. 0 Staff positions 81 75 80 1. 3 Allegations received 2,415 2,121 1,999 20.8 INS Office of Internal Audit Funding (in millions) $2.3 $1.1 $0.9 156 Staff positions 13 7 5 160 Allegations received 2,866 1,813 1,558 84 Customs employees: Treasury OIG a Funding (in millions) $4.93 $4.16 $4.91 0.4 Staff positions 33 37 39 -15.4 Allegations received 107 139 146 -26.7 Customs Internal Affairs a Funding (in millions) $38.7 $35.4 $32.7 18.3% Staff positions 283 290 286 -1.0 Allegations received 2,198 2,506 2,367 -7.1 a The data shown for the Treasury OIG and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs are for both criminal and administrative misconduct allegations handled by the agencies. Neither agency's records permitted us to reliably estimate the allocation of resource use between criminal and administrative allegations. Source: Justice OIG, INS, Treasury OIG, and Customs data. Table III. 1: Resource and Workload Data for Selected Organizations Responsible for Investigating Alleged Wrongdoing by INS and Customs Employees, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1997 Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of DrugRelated Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 Page 35 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control This appendix summarizes each of the cases involving 28 individual INS or Customs employees assigned to the Southwest Border who were convicted of drug- related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997. The cases are grouped by the type of criminal activity in which each individual was principally engaged. Case 1 A Customs inspector assigned to San Ysidro, CA, conspired to wave a load of cocaine through the port and provided sensitive law enforcement information to drug smugglers. Both prior to and during work, the inspector communicated information about his shift and lane assignments to drug smugglers by telephone and pager. The smugglers planned to use the information to ensure that the drug load passed through the inspector's lane while he was on duty. He was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and sentenced to 15 years and 8 months imprisonment. Case 2 An immigration inspector assigned to El Paso, TX, was recruited by his brother- in- law to assist in smuggling marijuana and cocaine through the port of entry. For several years, the inspector provided the drug smugglers with his scheduled duty time and lane assignments using a pay telephone or cellular telephone. On occasion, the smugglers drove to the inspector's lane where the inspector would hand the driver a piece of paper giving the lanes and times he would be on duty. The smugglers drove their vehicles, loaded with up to 1,000 pounds of marijuana each, to the inspector's lane and were waved through the port of entry without inspection. The investigation established that the inspector was living beyond his means. He was convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana, importation of marijuana, and bribery. Prior to his sentencing, the inspector was released on bond. He fled and remains a fugitive. Case 3 An immigration inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, waved drug- laden vehicles through his lane at the port of entry over a period of about 2 years. The investigation established that he paid over $25,000 cash for a new motor vehicle. The inspector pled guilty to conspiracy to launder monetary instruments and was sentenced to 6 years and 6 months imprisonment. Waving Drug- Laden Vehicles Through a Port of Entry Without Inspection Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 Page 36 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Case 4 An immigration inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, conspired with another immigration inspector (see case 6), a Customs inspector (see case 8) and a former INS detention enforcement officer (DEO) to smuggle drugs into the United States. Over an 18- month period, the inspector waved vehicles bearing approximately 6 tons of cocaine through the port of entry without inspection. The smugglers used spotters, radio, telephone, verbal communications, and a prearranged signaling system to guide drivers to the corrupt inspectors' lanes. The inspector was convicted of charges that included conspiracy to import cocaine and importation of cocaine. He was sentenced to 8 years and 1 month imprisonment. Case 5 An immigration inspector assigned to El Paso, TX, waved approximately 10 shipments of marijuana through a port of entry without inspection. The inspector notified the smuggler of his lane assignments using encrypted messages. The smuggler drove to the inspector's lane and notified him which vehicle( s) that were following him contained the marijuana. The inspector allowed the marijuana- laden vehicles to pass through his lane uninspected. After his shift, the inspector met the smuggler at a local restaurant and received his payment. According to the inspector, he became involved with the drug smuggler because he had substantial credit card debt and was on the verge of bankruptcy. He was convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana and bribery and was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. Case 6 An immigration inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, was recruited to smuggle drugs by a woman he met while off duty. The woman's mother acted as a spotter and used a pager to relay information about the inspector's lane assignment to her daughter, who rode in the drug- laden car. When the vehicle reached the inspector's booth, he recognized his accomplice and waved the vehicle through his lane without inspection. After his shift ended, the inspector went to a prearranged location to receive payment. The inspector was also implicated in another drug conspiracy (see case 4). He pled guilty to bribery charges and was sentenced to 8 years and 8 months imprisonment. Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 Page 37 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Case 7 An immigration inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, agreed to allow her boyfriend, a member of a narcotics smuggling family, to drive a vehicle loaded with marijuana through her lane without inspection. She was arrested for conspiracy to import marijuana and pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to import marijuana. She was sentenced to 1 year and 6 months imprisonment. Case 8 A Customs inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, conspired with two immigration inspectors (see cases 4 and 6), a former INS DEO, and six other individuals to smuggle thousands of pounds of cocaine and marijuana into the United States between 1983 and 1992. The former DEO used his friendships with the Customs inspector and the immigration inspectors to bring drugs through the port of entry. The drug smugglers used spotters, radio, telephone, verbal communications, and a prearranged signaling system to coordinate the drug movements. The Customs inspector and the immigration inspectors permitted the drug vehicles to enter the United States without inspection. The Customs inspector was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and marijuana and was sentenced to 24 years and 4 months imprisonment. Case 9 A Customs inspector assigned to Douglas, AZ, was arrested after a marijuana shipment was seized from a vehicle trying to pass through the inspector's lane at the port of entry. When narcotics dogs alerted canine enforcement officers to the vehicle, the driver attempted to flee in his vehicle, but was apprehended. After the driver's arrest, the inspector admitted that he had known that the vehicle contained drugs. He also admitted that he had waved the same vehicle through his lane without inspection twice during the previous week. When the driver reached the inspection booth, he used a prearranged signal to notify the inspector that the vehicle should be passed without inspection. The inspector pled guilty to conspiracy to import marijuana and bribery and was sentenced to 5 years and 8 months imprisonment. Case 10 A Customs inspector assigned to El Paso, TX, recruited and conspired with a second Customs inspector (see case 11) to allow drug loads through a Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 Page 38 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control port of entry. Because the first inspector was not working at the port of entry, he recruited the second inspector who was assigned to the port. The two were arrested after they arrived at a local restaurant to receive payment in exchange for allowing a load of cocaine to pass through the port of entry. The inspector was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and three counts of bribery. He was sentenced to 24 years and 4 months imprisonment. Case 11 A Customs inspector assigned to El Paso, TX, conspired with another Customs inspector (see case 10) to wave drug loads through his lane without inspection. The drug crossings were prearranged by telephone. The inspector used a pager and a code to notify the drug smuggler of the lane he would be working and the time to pass through the port of entry. The inspector waved all vehicles through his lane without inspecting any vehicles or referring any for secondary inspection. The inspector was arrested after he went to a local restaurant to receive a bribe for allowing a 1,000- kilogram load of cocaine through the port of entry. He pled guilty to bribery and was sentenced to 7 years and 6 months imprisonment. Case 12 An immigration inspector assigned to the Hidalgo, TX, port of entry was arrested after he accepted bribes to wave drug loads through the port of entry uninspected. The inspector met the drug smuggler in Mexico and told him when he would be on duty. On one occasion, the smuggler parked his drug- laden vehicle in Mexico and walked half way across the international bridge that leads to the port of entry. From there, the smuggler determined what lane the inspector was assigned to work. He returned to his vehicle and drove to the inspector's lane. After the drug smuggler was arrested for smuggling marijuana, the inspector admitted he had accepted bribes to wave drug loads through the port of entry. He pled guilty to bribery charges and was sentenced to 4 years and 9 months imprisonment. Case 13 An immigration inspector assigned to the San Ysidro, CA, port of entry was arrested for waving drug- laden vehicles through the port. A social acquaintance and drug trafficker asked the inspector to allow him to admit a small amount of marijuana through the port. The inspector agreed and over the course of a year admitted between 10 and 15 drug loads through Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 Page 39 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control his lane without inspection. The trafficker would telephone the inspector at his home to determine his schedule. The trafficker would locate the inspector on the line the next workday, or meet with the inspector at a local restaurant after the inspector started his shift. At these meetings, the inspector would tell the trafficker what lanes and times he was working. After his arrest, the inspector pled guilty to conspiracy to import a controlled substance and bribery charges. He was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. Case 14 An immigration inspector assigned to Hidalgo, TX, assisted Mexican drug trafficking organizations by allowing thousands of kilograms of cocaine and tons of marijuana to pass through his inspection lane at the port of entry. He also obtained law enforcement information and passed it on to drug traffickers. In addition, the inspector received and attempted to sell drugs. He was arrested and charged with conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 10 years and 1 month imprisonment. Case 15 A Border Patrol agent assigned to Douglas, AZ, engaged in marijuana trafficking using his Border Patrol vehicle to transport marijuana from a predetermined pickup point at the border to a different location. After he arrived at work and received his assignment, the agent coordinated the movement of drug loads by telephoning his accomplice( s) in Mexico and providing a code to indicate where the loads could be safely brought across the international boundary. Once the marijuana had been brought across the border, he picked it up and loaded it into his Border Patrol vehicle, and drove it to a predetermined location, where it was then transferred to another vehicle. The agent pled guilty to conspiracy to import marijuana, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and bribery. He was sentenced to 12 years and 7 months imprisonment. Case 16 A Border Patrol agent assigned to Chula Vista, CA, worked with a relative to smuggle loads of marijuana across the border. The relative would transport approximately three 250- pound loads of marijuana across the border per week. During his shift, the agent picked up the drugs and loaded them into his government vehicle. He then transferred the Coordinating the Movement of Drugs Across the Southwest Border Between Ports of Entry Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 Page 40 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control marijuana to his personal vehicle and transported the marijuana to his residence. The agent was arrested after a search of his residence revealed approximately 1 pound of marijuana, drug scales, packaging material, and $16,700 in cash. He pled guilty to possession of marijuana for sale and was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment. Case 17 A Border Patrol agent assigned to Douglas, AZ, assisted drug traffickers in transporting a shipment of cocaine across the border. He was not on duty at the time he attempted to assist the drug smugglers. Two Border Patrol agents who were on duty patrolling the border at night intercepted radio transmissions among what sounded like drug smugglers coordinating the movement of drugs across the border. One of the Border Patrol agents thought he recognized the voice of one of the drug smugglers as belonging to a Border Patrol agent whom he knew. A short time later, the agents encountered the off- duty agent dressed in black, wearing a two- way radio, and riding a bicycle along the border. At the Border Patrol agent's trial, prosecutors presented evidence that the agent had spent large sums of cash to buy cars and real estate. Convicted of 11 felonies involving narcotics smuggling and money laundering, he was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. Case 18 An INS DEO assigned to Los Fresnos, TX, conspired with two colleagues 1 (see case 19) and a former DEO to transport drug loads past Border Patrol checkpoints using official INS vehicles. These DEOs generally transported aliens to Houston for deportation. The former DEO, who had become a drug smuggler, recruited a former colleague, who, in turn, recruited another DEO. On at least three occasions, the DEOs transported drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints. One method the smugglers used was to load drugs in the luggage compartment of an INS bus prior to reaching a Border Patrol checkpoint. The Border Patrol agents at the checkpoint did not inspect the official government vehicles the smugglers used. After the drugs had been successfully transported past the checkpoint, they were removed from the INS vehicle. The DEO was arrested and convicted of drug conspiracy, money laundering, and bribery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 One of the DEOs involved in the conspiracy was indicted but fled prior to trial and remains a fugitive. Because he was not convicted, his case is not included among the 28 listed in this appendix. Transporting Drugs Past Border Patrol Checkpoints Within the United States Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 Page 41 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Case 19 An INS DEO assigned to Los Fresnos, TX, conspired with two colleagues and a former DEO to transport drug loads past INS checkpoints using INS vehicles (see case 18). The DEO was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, conspiracy to launder money, and two counts of bribery. He was sentenced to 5 years and 3 months imprisonment. Case 20 A Border Patrol agent stationed at the Falfurrias, TX, checkpoint was recruited by a DEO, who was a longtime friend, to assist in a drugsmuggling operation (see case 21). He aided the smugglers by waving drug loads through the checkpoint without inspection. In addition, he drove loads of marijuana through the checkpoint just prior to going on duty. The agent checked his work schedule to see who was working at the checkpoint during the shift preceding his own. He would only drive the marijuana through the checkpoint when certain Border Patrol agents, who he was friends with, or who he felt comfortable with, were working. He deposited the drug loads at a safe house located beyond the checkpoint. He would then return to the checkpoint to work his shift. He pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months imprisonment. Case 21 An INS DEO was recruited by a narcotics smuggler to facilitate drug shipments from the Rio Grande Valley to Chicago, IL. He recruited a longtime friend, who was a Border Patrol agent, to wave loads through the Falfurrias, TX, checkpoint (see case 20). The officer was arrested attempting to drive a pickup truck loaded with 292 pounds of marijuana through the Falfurrias checkpoint. He pled guilty to bribery charges and was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. Case 22 A Border Patrol agent assigned to Naco, AZ, skimmed legitimate drug seizures he made from aliens and either sold the drugs to drug dealers or accepted a share of the profits from the drug dealer's sale of the drugs. One of the drug dealers was the agent's girlfriend's brother. After the brother's arrest, he testified at the agent's trial. The investigation established that the agent was living beyond his means. After the agent Selling Drugs Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 Page 42 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control was arrested, he was released on bond and fled to New Zealand. He was apprehended and extradited to the United States. He was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The agent was sentenced to 27 years and 6 months imprisonment. Case 23 A Customs operational analysis specialist, responsible for identifying importers who were suspected of smuggling drugs through the Rio Grande Valley, agreed to sell confidential drug- related intelligence information. He was convicted of bribery and disclosure of confidential information and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. Case 24 A Customs inspector assigned to Calexico, CA, was arrested after an investigation revealed that she was disclosing sensitive law enforcement information to her boyfriend, who was a drug trafficker. She pled guilty to disclosure of confidential information and was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment. Case 25 A Customs canine enforcement officer assigned to El Paso, TX, drove a drug- laden vehicle from Mexico to the United States through a port of entry. The officer relied on his friendships with coworkers at the port to ensure that his vehicle would not be inspected. In addition, he agreed to drive a load of marijuana through a checkpoint if it was closed. After his arrest, the officer pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to 3 years and 4 months imprisonment. Case 26 A Border Patrol agent assigned to El Paso, TX, was associated with the leader of a vehicle theft ring that stole new vehicles from dealerships and traded them for drugs. He was arrested after he traded a stolen truck's engine and transmission for a kilogram of cocaine. The agent was convicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 6 years and 6 months imprisonment. Disclosing Drug Intelligence Information Other Appendix IV Summaries of Closed Cases Involving INS or Customs Employees Convicted of Drug- Related Crimes, Fiscal Years 1992- 1997 Page 43 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Case 27 An immigration inspector assigned to San Ysidro, CA, was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The inspector, who was a drug user, committed his crime while off duty. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 4 months imprisonment. Case 28 A Customs inspector assigned to Douglas, AZ, was arrested, along with three coconspirators, and charged with conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. One of the coconspirators was a former INS immigration inspector who resigned from INS after drugs were seized from a car that he had waved through the port of entry. The Customs inspector was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appendix V Completion of Employment Background Reinvestigations Page 44 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Reinvestigations overdue Total reinvestigations completed when due Total reinvestigations overdue Total reinvestigations completed after due date Total reinvestigations not completed as of March 1998 Fiscal Year Position Total reinvestigations due Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 1997 Customs Inspector 368 99 27 269 73 25 7 244 66 INS Immigration Inspector 103 46 45 57 55 12 12 45 44 INS Border Patrol Agent 393 64 16 329 84 85 22 244 62 1996 Customs Inspector 294 46 16 248 84 124 42 124 42 INS Immigration Inspector 67 29 43 38 57 8 12 30 45 INS Border Patrol Agent 233 44 19 189 81 107 46 82 35 1995 Customs Inspector 120 16 13 104 87 51 43 53 44 INS Immigration Inspector 78 28 36 50 64 31 40 19 24 INS Border Patrol Agent 344 69 20 275 80 182 53 93 27 Source: GAO analysis of INS and Customs data. Table V. 1: Completion of Employment Reinvestigations Due in Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1997 for Southwest Border Customs Inspectors, INS Immigration Inspectors, and INS Border Patrol Agents Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice Page 45 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice Page 46 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice Page 47 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice Page 48 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Justice Page 49 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VII Comments From the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Page 50 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VII Comments From the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Page 51 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 52 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 53 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 54 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 55 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 56 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 57 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 58 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 59 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 60 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 61 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix VIII Comments From the Customs Service Page 62 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Appendix IX Major Contributors to This Report Page 63 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Weldon McPhail, Assistant Director Jay Jennings, Evaluator- in- Charge Mark Tremba, Senior Evaluator David Alexander, Senior Social Science Analyst Michael Little, Communications Analyst Fredrick D. Berry, Senior Evaluator Enemencio S. Sanchez, Evaluator Michael H. Harmond, Evaluator Jan Montgomery, Assistant General Counsel General Government Division, Washington, D. C. Dallas Field Office Office of the General Counsel Page 64 GAO/GGD-99-31 Drug Control Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Order by mail: U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 or visit: Room 1100 700 4 th St. NW (corner of 4 th and G Sts. NW) U. S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512- 6000 or by using fax number (202) 512- 6061, or TDD (202) 512- 2537. 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