X. THE HEART OF THE MATTER-SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TOTHF MARIJUANA LAWS: 1965-1970
Perhaps the most significant legal development engendered by the new class of marijuana users and shift in medical opinion is the vigorous wave of substantive constitutional attacks on the marijuana laws launched in 1965. Although the challengers have employed many labels, the essence of their attacks is an insistence on rationality in the legislative process. Contending that marijuana is a harmless euphoriant, the challengers have questioned governmental authority to prohibit its use at all. Arguing that it is no more, and perhaps less, harmful than alcohol and tobacco, the challengers have indicted as irrational the total prohibition of one coupled with permissive regulation of the others. Conversely, the challengers have vigorously attacked the arbitrary inclusion of marijuana in the legislative classification "narcotics" with admittedly harmful opiates and cocaine. Finally, the severity of the punishments imposed for marijuana violations has been attacked as violative of the eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause. A potent weapon in advancing these attacks has been the fact that the state and federal legislatures never conducted meaningful investigation into the effects of the drug, but relied instead on hearsay and emotional pleas.
Although the judiciary has become increasingly sympathetic to these challenges, to date it has left the legislation intact. As we inquire into the reasons for this recalcitrance, the reader should recall the nature of the judicial debate about intoxicants a half century ago. As the scope of the due process and equal protection clauses was substantially broadened over the years, the free-form "pursuit of happiness" and "inherent limitations" approaches were laid on the ash heap of constitutional history. As a result of the incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth amendment, there now exist a plethora of more or less "explicit" constitutional limitations upon which the challengers have relied. Analytically, however, the marijuana challengers have asked the courts to fit square pegs into round constitutional holes. The dynamism of recent constitutional interpretation has not yet eroded the obstacles in the challengers' path. But this is not to say that this erosion should not, and will not, eventually occur. In the succeeding pages, we shall evaluate the merits of the various arguments and the adequacy of the judicial responses.
A. The Burden o f Justification: The Importance of Having a Presumption on Your Side.
The mortar in the wall separating judicial from legislative power is the presumption of constitutionality of legislative action. Although this presumption evaporates where "legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,"1 or where it affects adversely other fundamental rights,2 the courts ordinarily wi11 defer to the nationality of legislative proscriptions, classifications and sanctions. When legislation is attacked as irrational, arbitrary or factually groundless, the pertinent questions are whether the judiciary should conduct its own factual inquiry, and how groundless the legislation must be to earn the "arbitrary" or "irrational" designation (or its contextual equivalent).
Because of the placement of the burden of (dis)proof, legislation is not "arbitrary" simply because the legislature did not conduct a fact finding investigation.3 When the legislation is attacked, the courts will assume that it was based on the collective knowledge and experience of the legislators. In short, the legislature, as a matter of constitutional law, has no affirmative duty to utilize the trappings of rationality.
Furthermore, legislation is not irrational simply because a factual hypothesis upon which it is premised cannot be proven. The legislature is entitled to guess and act upon the contemporary state of knowledge or ignorance. The generally accepted "facts" about marijuana in the 1920's and 1930's, when the drug's possession and use were criminalized, were that it was physically addictive, caused insanity, and generate crimes of violence. Later, in the 1950's, legislation was premised on the hypothesis that marijuana was the stepping stone to heroin and the other opiates. Since the assumptions could not be conclusively disproved, the legislation was rationally related to the legitimate objectives of preventing crime, pauperism and disease. As the California court in Ex parte Yun Quong had noted in 1911 in response to an attack on the early anti-opium laws:
[B]ut the validity of legislation which would be necessary or proper under a given state of facts does not depend upon the actual existence of the supposed facts. It is enough if the law-making body may rationally believe such facts to be establishcd.4
Between 1950 and 1965 attacks on the marijuana laws were repelled in this manner since medical inquiry had not yet produced affirmative evidence of irrationality. Challenges to the classification of marijuana as a narcotic were rebuffed either by citing Navaro and the other cases first upholding the marijuana laws,5 or by quoting Ex parte Yun Quong.6 By 1965, however, the revolution in marijuana use was underway, and independent medical researchers had begun to challenge the venerable assumptions. Armed with an increasing volume of scientific literature in their favor,7 challengers have assaulted the legislation in court in ail effort to prove that "facts judicially known or proved preclude" the legislation's rationality.8 Several trial judges have taken evidence on the physiological, psychological and sociological effects of marijuana,9 and some appellate courts have suggested that such steps be taken in their respective inferior courts.10 In Colorado, trial judges have twice declared that state's marijuana laws unconstitutional on the basis of such evidence only to be reversed both times.11 Again and again the, verdict has been the same: Despite the substantial weight of authority regarding the mildness of the drug, enough doubt remains and enough rational men still consider the drug harmful that the courts cannot say the legislation is irrational.12 Some have expressed their own doubts about the accuracy of the factual premises and the wisdom of the legislative judgments pertaining to marijuana,13 but even they have been constrained to uphold the legislation. At the other extreme, some courts continue to rely on the old myths, considering the question well settled14 and rebuffing, the challengers' attacks with a swish of the robed forearm:
Clearly, the use of marijuana and other drugs . . . presents a danger to the public safety and welfare of the community since they are clearly related to each other and to the commission of crime.15
Many legislators hesitate to revise the marijuana laws drastically, because they feel the data is not yet complete. For the same reason, the courts have been even more reluctant to find that present legislation has no rational basis in fact, a finding made only in the rarest circumstances.
Assuming for present purposes that the legislation is entitled to the traditional presumption, we believe the attacks grounded in the due process and equal protection clauses should fail. On the other hand, we are not convinced that challenges grounded in the rationality arm of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment are without merit. This argument has the advantage of acknowledging the rationality of criminalization while indicting the severity of the sanction.
1. Due Process and Equal Protection: Rationality of the Classification
The concurrent classification of marijuana as a "narcotic" with the "hard drugs" and the permissive treatment of alcohol form the basis of the "Irrationality" argument. Whether grounded in the minimum substantive content of the due process clause, in the overinclusive and underinclusive aspects of the equal protection clause, or in an independent limitation on the police power, the contention is the same: The legislative classification is not reasonably related to a valid legislative purpose.
The initial inquiry ought to focus on the nature of the state's objective. The first possible objective we will call the "rationality" rationale. The state's aim may be to promote productivity, rationality and participation in social processes, and conversely to prevent the citizen from "turning off" or frustrating his ability to function in socially desirable ways. Under this rationale, prohibition of all drug use would be rationally related to the state's objective. Similar treatment of "hard" narcotics and marijuana would be justified, since no distinctions need be drawn between moderate and chronic use or between divergent ancillary social and physical effects. The real issues are whether this is a legitimate objective and whether the permissive treatment of alcohol invalidates the scheme.
As to the first issue, we do not believe that American governmental institutions are empowered to impose the Protestant Ethic upon a free people. Although we will explore this question in some detail below from another perspective,16 we note for now that opposition to mere use of euphoriants has never been the focus of legislative inquiry or the public opinion process in the entire history of drug regulation in this country. As we noted earlier,17 although total abstention was a peripheral concern of some proponents of Prohibition, that movement was directed primarily at the evils associated with excessive use and commercial distribution. Some judges recently have upheld marijuana legislation simply because marijuana is a "mind-altering drug," 18 but it is unlikely that they perceived the implications of their statements.
As to the second issue, if we assume that rationalism is a legitimate objective of drug legislation, it is a long-standing constitutional principle that the legislature need not "cover the waterfront." If the law-makers determine, as a result of the failure of Prohibition for example, that regulation" is the only feasible approach to alcohol, that judgment does not vitiate a prohibitionary approach to other intoxicants. That the legislature acts piecemeal does not make its actions any less "rational."
The state's objective in drug legislation may be to prevent excessive or chronic use on the ground that such use totally destroys the user's social utility and is likely to render him dependent on the state for subsistence. Although this "dependency" rationale is designed immediately to protect each citizen from himself, its mediate aim is the public good. In this respect marijuana prohibition resembles legislation requiring motorcycle users to wear crash helmets. Again, there is some dispute regarding the legitimacy of this objective, a question to which we will return below.
Assuming the validity of the "dependency" rationale, however, the relevant factual inquiry focuses on the respective use patterns and effects of "hard" narcotics, marijuana and alcohol. The challengers contend that it is scientifically established that marijuana is not physically addictive, causes no permanent harm, and that its users do not develop a tolerance to the drug.
The irrationality of classifying marijuana with the opiates and cocaine is aggravated, they contend, by the fact that there are six million chronic alcoholics in this country. In response to these arguments, some courts have noted that there is some evidence for the proposition that marijuana produces a "serious degree of psychological dependence, that it encourages experimentation with other drugs and that it may lead to addiction of narcotics." 21 Accordingly, since "reasonable men may entertain the belief that the use of [marijuana], once begun, almost inevitably leads to excess, such belief affords a sufficient justification for applying restrictions to these drugs." 22 In addition some courts have noted that there is some evidence that the smoking of marijuana may induce (albeit temporarily) "psychotic breaks" in predisposed individuals.
Although the logic of the stepping stone and psychotic break arguments is suspect in determining valid state interest, we believe that contrary medical findings are still too tentative with respect to the psychological effects of marijuana use to sustain an irrationality challenge under the "dependency" rationale. In addition, the piecemeal principle once again counters the challengers' underinclusive equal protection argument with respect to alcohol or LSD,24 allegedly more harmful drugs not classified as "narcotics." To the extent that some courts have searched for differences between alcohol and marijuana to defend directly the legislative scheme, they have usually been on shaky ground. For example, Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Tauro stated in Commonwealth v. Leis, after a full factual inquiry on the effects of marijuana:
The ordinary user of marijuana is quite likely to be a marginally adjusted person who turns to the drug to avoid confrontation with and the resolution of his problems. The majority of alcohol users are well adjusted, productively employed individuals who use alcohol for relaxation and as an incident of other social activities.25
Such statements misconstrue prevalent use patterns of both alcohol and marijuana. Moreover, such differentiation is grounded not in the "dependency" rationale but in the dubious "rationality" rationale. Judge Tauro would have been better advised to stick to the piecemeal principle, as have the California intermediate appellate courts .26
The third possible objective of marijuana legislation is to
prevent harm to others. For four decades, prohibition of
marijuana has been based primarily on the
"other-regarding" rationale.-The relevant factual
hypotheses are that marijuana use causes violent crime directly,
that it leads to use of hard drugs and thereby causes violent
crime indirectly and that it causes "psychomotor
discoordination" and thereby causes accidents by those under
its influence.
Contemporary challengers have charged that these assumptions
are completely without merit in light of contemporary medical
knowledge. Although some courts continue to intone the old myths,
relying on police testimony correlating marijuana use and violent
crime, 27 others
have openly recognized the unsubstantiated character of each of these hypotheses .28
Nevertheless, these courts have sustained the 1egislation because of the continuing, uncertainty about the drug's effects.29 Rather their supporting the hypothesis that marijuana intoxication independently causes violence, the courts have focused on the unpredictable effects of the drug depending on the psychological predisposition of the user. Since there is some evidence that marijuana can be especially volatile when used by despondent, hostile or unstable persons, a prophylactic approach is rational.30
Similarly, while recognizing that there is no support for a direct causal link between marijuana use and hard narcotics use, the courts have held that some marijuana users' graduation to more dangerous drugs due to environmental conditions is enough to uphold the legislation.31 Finally, recognizing that the possibility of reckless use of dangerous instruments while under the influence of marijuana might not ordinarily justify its total prohibition, the courts have relied instead on evidence. that there is no scientific means of detecting whether or not a person is under the drug's influence, as there is with alcohol.32
Taken Individually, each of these justifications leaves something to be desired. First, individuals psychologically predisposed to violent conduct will, in all likelihood, snap under the influence of some other catalyst, even if deprived of marijuana. Second the stepping-stone theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy even to the extent that there is a correlation between marijuana use and hard narcotics use. Were it not for prohibitionary marijuana legislation, users of that drug would not come into contract with illegal activity and perhaps consequently with narcotics pushers. Finally, there is persuasive evidence for the proposition that marijuana users are ordinarily rendered immobile and are unlikely to endanger others by driving automobiles.33
Taken collectively, however, these hypotheses provide a rational basis for prohibitionary legislation, the objective of which is to prevent harm to others. We conclude that there is not yet sufficient uniformity of medical opinion to overcome any presumption of rationality attaching to marijuana legislation. Those courts directly confronting the issue have responded correctly, regardless of the precise constitutional framework within which they have worked.
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Rationality of the Sanction
Since marijuana penalties were drastically increased in the 1950's, the marijuana laws have been attacked repeatedly on the ground that high mandatory minimum sentences without parole or probation are cruel and unusual punishment. The starting point for resolution of this question is the Supreme Court's highly ambiguous decision in 1910 in Weems v. United States.34 The Court struck down a fifteen-year sentence at "hard and painful labor" imposed under Philippine law for falsifying a public document because the sentence was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment" as well as "unusual in its character." 35 The punishment was condemned "both on account of . . . [its] degree and kind." 36 Because the incidents of the challenged imprisonment were particularly abhorrent-"a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property" 37 some courts and commentators believe that Weems does not depart from the traditional view that the eighth amendment speaks only to mode of punishment, not to length.38 Yet some members of the Court have stated that the amendment was directed "against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged."39 And the Court in Weems stated that the punishments there in question came "under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind." Accordingly, although the jurisprudence of the eighth amendment is virtually nonexistent, courts and commentators have assumed that the amendment has a proportionality dimensions.41
The difficult question is the proper standard for testing the constitutionality of allegedly excessive sentences. Although detailed inquiry into the subtleties of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, the battle is between those who would apply a fringe "decency" test42 and those who would apply a "rationality" test that essentially extends the minimum substantive content of the due process clause to the relation between crime and punishment.43 As applied to marijuana legislation, a "decency" inquiry would have been fruitless in the 1950's and 1960's but may yet succeed in the 1970's. Under that test, a punishment is unconstitutional only if "so aberrational as to violate 'standards of decency more or less universally accepted.'" 44 Since the history of marijuana legislation has again and again been characterized by varying degrees of hysteria in differing jurisdictions, there is no available measure of human decency against which to test the action. Moreover, if the legislatures are uniformly harsh, the judicial conscience is not likely to be shocked. However, as increasing numbers of state legislatures and the Congress finally begin to de-escalate the penalties for marijuana offenses, those states that maintain the 1950 punishment levels are likely to find themselves lagging behind "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
One contention that can, and has, been raised in the drug context has been that the penalty must bear a reasonable relation to the seriousness of the offense when compared with the punishments for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction and for the same crime in other jurisdictions. The evolution of judicial response to this argument in marijuana cases has followed a path consistent with the change in use patterns and in public response.
In the first case raising this cruel and unusual punishment
issue, State V. 7'130777aS,"') the Louisiana Supreme Court
upheld ill 1953 thwart state's
41 See, e.g., Gallcgo v. United States, 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1960); Furl-cingrton,
Uncoustit7vionally Excessive hinisliments, 3 CRIM. L. 145 (1967); Note, Tbe
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and thc Substanth-c Criminal Law, 79 IJARV. L.
Rrv. 635 (1966).
42 See Packer, supra note 38.
43 Cf. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889-91 (Goldberg,
J., dissenting fron) denial of certiorari).
44 Packer, supra note 38, at 1076.
4-5 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
11@ 224 I.a. 431, 69 So. 2d 738 (19M.
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years without parole for unlawful possession. The court said that the eighth amendment did not apply to the states and that similar state provisions spoke only to "form or nature of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration and amount. 11 47 Finally, the court noted that, even if Weems applied, " [I] n view of the moral degeneration inherent in all aspects of the crime denounced by the Narcotics Act, it cannot be said that the length or severity of -the punishment here prescribed is disproportioned to the offense." 11 Five years later, the Texas Supreme Court upheld a life sentence for first offense possession, and stated that the legislature was solely responsible for assessing the permissible limits of punishment and
that the was solely responsible for affixing sentence in a particular
case. 49
In 1960, the Ninth Circuit in Gallego v. United States-10
upheld the
provision of the 1956 Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act
imposing a five-year mandatory minimum sentence without
suspension, pi@obation or parole for unlawful importation of
marijuana. Assuming an excessiveness holding to be implicit in
Weems, the court noted nevertheless that the penalty was not
"so out of proportion to the crime cornmitted that it shocks
a balanced sense of justice. At worst," the court continued,
"it merely forbids in this kind of case and for good reason
the discretionary granting of special benefits which Congress did
not have to permit in the first place." 11 The summary
treatment of the issue is easily explained by the court's
apparent lack of sympathy with mari)uana users; it quoted
approvingly the moral denouncement delivered in Thomas .51
Slowly the tide began to turn. A California court recently
blanched at upholding the five-year minimum sentence imposed for
giving away
471d. at 435, 69 So. 2d at 740.
481d. In State v. Bellam, 225 La. 445, 73 So. 2d 311 (1954), the court rebuffed a similar challenge to a seven-year sentence without parole for a second offense of possession of marijuana by simply citing Thomas.
49Garcia v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 482, 316 SAV.2d 734 (1958). The statute provided that a first offense was punishable by not less than two years nor more than life. The court applied the hands-off principle common to state courts, according to which any sentence within the statutory limits is valid. See, e.g., Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964); Saunders v. State, 208 Tenn. 347, 345 S.W.2d 899 (1961); State v. Jiles, 230 S.C. 148, 94 S.E.2d 891 (1956).
50 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1960).
61 Id. at 918.
52 Id. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Gallego in Halprin v.
United States, 295 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1961), and Bettis v. United
States, 408 F.2d 563 (9th Cit. 1969).
()Ile 111MI)IMIM Cl(@Y;Itctlff," ("TeCIA11v when
the cise lud entrapment over It 'I, Llifited Stijt(,S ;Z,.
If/1(jj_d51 ;ISJ@C(i tjIC roncis.," But Ili ]@M thc
o1cfcn(im' I I
Sc\cIlth Circult to da-larc 1111collstitlitional, as @ippilcd to marl-juaria, tho:
Sclitencill(v provisions of the 1956 Act previousIv upheld by Gallefo
The no parole provision I I
Alld S11bScqtIcIlt CJSC@. as '11(ficted as incon-
sistcm with current mccilcal knomiledge. After quoting ,it
length from the then rccientiv rcicnscd Report of the President's
Commission on F111forcement nrici Administration of Justice and
from the Task 14orce Report ()II Drut_y Abuse, the court
concluded:
I I 1 hc proo-I ess ( d sclk:ntific rcscii:-cli III flic wholc arca of imi-cotics and LI
drug iihusc, durina dic cleven vears slncc [passaoc of the 1956 Actj 1@ O
has not resulted III tho: establishment of scicntific
kno-wicdac to the c_xtent that would cimbic Lis to ritillify
Isection 11237 1 on constitutionnI grounds, even c deemcd
appropriate to do so.@")
Thus appeared the purpo.-tual fatc of ratiollailtv
arguillents, whalICT :applied to sanction ()I- to classification.
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(ht;l IIICOIICILISIVC'-)(; .111d Aiass@ichusctts`l and
(,'@jjlforl)M"' COUrts hwh @umjnarliv dismissed cighth
:-lincridilicrit :-Aro-ti 111crIts,
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Footnotes
4 159 Cal. 508, 515, 114 P. 835, 838 (191 1) (emphasis
added).
5 E.g., Gonzalez v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 49, 323 S.W.2d 55 (1959), citing Gonzalez v. State, 1963 Tex. Crim. 432, 293 S.W.2d 786 (1956); Miller v. State, 50 Del. 579, 137 A.2d 388 (1958), citing State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933).
6 People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 880 (1966); People v. Mistriel, 110 Cal. App. 2d 110, 241 P.2d 1050 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
7 See pp. 1104-10 supra.
8 South Carolina Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S.
177, 191 (1938) (emphasis added) -
9 See United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969); Raines v. State, 225 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1969); People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965); Commonwealth v. Leis, Nos. 28841-2, 2884-4-51 28864-5 (Suffolk Super. Ct. 1968), aff1d, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969); cf. People v. McKenzie, 458 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1969).
10 E.g., Scott v. United States, 395 F.2d 619, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Walton, 116 111. App. 2d 293, 296, 253, N.F..2d 537, 539 (1969).
11. People v. McKenzie, 458 P. 2d 232 (Colo. 1969); People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P. 2d 923 (1965)
12. See cases cited notes 28-31 infra.
13. E.g., United States v. Kleinhalzer, 306 F. Supp. 311, 317 (E.D. N.Y. 1969) (Weinstein, J.); People v. McKenzie, 458 P. 2d 232, 236 (Colo. 1969)
14. Robinson v. United States, 327 F. 2d 618, 624 (8th Cir. 1964) (Blackmun, J.) ("the boundary line, if any, between narcotics and marijuana is indistinct and . . . .statutes and interpreting courts do not give much emphasis to it"); Spence v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 419, 420, 183 N.E. 2d 363, 364 (1962) ("There is no question that the state had, under its police power, the right to classify cannabis as a narcotic drug.") People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. Deined, 385 U.S. 880 (1966).
16 See text at notes 132-35 infra.
17 See p. 979 supra.
18 E.g., Raines v. State, 225 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1969).
19 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E. 2d, 898, 905 (Mass. 1969)
20 See Borras V. State, 229 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1969).
21, People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 602-03, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174-75 (Dist. Ct. App.) cert. Denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968)
22. Id. At 600, 65 Cal. Rptr. At 173
23 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E. 2d, 898, 902 (Mass. 1969)
24 Defendant in People v. McKenzie, 458 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1969), varied the traditional underinclusiveness argument. He contended that the continued classification of marijuana as a "narcotic" drug after a legislative revision in 1968 could not be defended, since LSD, clearly a more harmful drug, was classified as a "dangerous" drug. Possession of LSD was a misdemeanor while possession of marijuana was a felony. Citing its decision in People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965), the Colorado Supreme Court deferred to the unusual classification.
25 3 SUFF. L. REV. 237 31 (1968).
26 See, e.g., People v. Catis, 264 Cal. App. 2d 324, 329, 70 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1108 (1969); People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 602, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 176 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968).
27 People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 67, 400 P.2d 923, 927-28 (1965); cf. People v. Oatis, 264 Cal. App. 2d 324, 70 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1108 (1969).
28 E.g., People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 602-03, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174-75 (1968); People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 66, 400 P.2d 923, 927 (1965).
29 People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 603, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 175 (1968).
30 Commonwealth v. Leis, Nos. 28841-2, 28844-5, 28864-5 (Suffolk Super. Ct. 1968), excerpted in 3 SUFF. L. Rev. 23, 27-28 (1968), aff'd, 335 Mass. 189, 243 N.F.2d 898 (1969).
31 E.g., Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Mass. 1969).
32 Id.
33 See p. 1105 supra,
34 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
35 Id. at 377.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 366.
38 E.g., Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L REv. 1071, 1075-76 (1964).
39 217 U.S. at 371, quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 3339-40 (1892) (Field, dissenting).
40 217 U.S. at 377.