Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption (Testimony, 04/21/99, GAO/T-GGD-99-86). The corruption of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service employees along the Southwest border by drug traffickers is a serious and continuing threat. Some of these employees have waved drug loads through ports of entry, coordinated the movement of drugs across the border, transported drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, sold drugs, and revealed drug intelligence information. Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures to help ensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to address the rising threat of employee corruption on the Southwest border. For example, although the agencies generally completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some cases by as much as three years. The Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs, which deal with allegations of drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs employees, are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases. However, GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees along the Southwest border who had been convicted of drug-related crimes between 1992 and 1997 found internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported or corrected. These weaknesses included instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the inspection lane at a port of entry, (2) INS and Customs employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting persons with whom they had close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel were allowed to cross the Southwest border or pass Border Control checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs have not formally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness. For example, GAO found that financial information required for background investigations and reinvestigations was either limited or not fully reviewed. This testimony summarizes the April 1999 report, GAO/GGD-99-31. --------------------------- Indexing Terms ----------------------------- REPORTNUM: T-GGD-99-86 TITLE: Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption DATE: 04/21/99 SUBJECT: Drug trafficking Smuggling Internal controls Bribery Ethical conduct Federal employees Personnel management Customs administration Crimes or offenses IDENTIFIER: Texas California ****************************************************************** ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a ** ** GAO report. This text was extracted from a PDF file. ** ** Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, ** ** headings, and bullets have not been preserved, and in some ** ** cases heading text has been incorrectly merged into ** ** body text in the adjacent column. Graphic images have ** ** not been reproduced, but figure captions are included. ** ** Tables are included, but column deliniations have not been ** ** preserved. ** ** ** ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when ** ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed ** ** document's contents. ** ** ** ** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO ** ** Document Distribution Center. For further details, please ** ** send an e-mail message to: ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** with the message 'info' in the body. ** ****************************************************************** DRUG CONTROL INS and Customs Can DoMore To Prevent DrugRelated EmployeeCorruption Statement of Richard M. Stana, Associate DirectorAdministration of Justice Issues General Government Division United States General Accounting OfficeGAO Testimony Before the Senate Caucus on International NarcoticsControl For Release on DeliveryExpected at 2:00 p.m., EDTon Wednesday April 21, 1999 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 SummaryDrug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug- Related EmployeeCorruption Page 1 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Some Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. CustomsService employees on the Southwest Border have engaged in a variety of illegal drug-related activities, including waving drug loads through ports ofentry, coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border, transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, selling drugs, anddisclosing drug intelligence information. Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures designed to helpensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learnedfrom closed corruption cases to fully address the increased threat of employee corruption on the Southwest Border. These policies andprocedures consist mainly of mandatory background investigations for new staff and 5-year reinvestigations of employees, as well as basicintegrity training. While the agencies generally completed required background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year onthe job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some instances, by as many as 3 years. Both INS and Customs provided integrity training to newemployees during basic training, but advanced integrity training was not required. The Departments of Justice and the Treasury have different organizationalstructures but similar policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug- related misconduct by INS and Customs employees. At Justice, theOffice of the Inspector General (OIG) is generally responsible for investigating criminal allegations against INS employees. GAO found thatthe Justice OIG generally complied with its policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related misconduct. At the Treasury, Customs'Office of Internal Affairs is generally responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal allegations against Customs employees.Customs' automated case management system and its investigative case files did not provide the necessary information to assess compliance withinvestigative procedures. INS and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and changetheir policies and procedures for preventing the drug- related corruption of their employees. The Justice OIG and Customs' Office of Internal Affairsare required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases, but have not done so. GAO's review of 28 casesinvolving INS and Customs employees assigned to the Southwest Border, who were convicted of drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through1997, revealed internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported and/or corrected. These weaknesses included instances where (1) drug Summary Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug- Related Employee Corruption Page 2 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 smugglers chose the inspection lane at a port of entry, (2) INS andCustoms employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting individuals with whom they had close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcementpersonnel were allowed to cross the Southwest Border or pass Border Patrol checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs had notformally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness. GAO made recommendations in response to theseweaknesses. StatementDrug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 3 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the serious and continuing threatof corruption to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service employees along the Southwest Border by personsinvolved in the illegal drug trade. The enormous sums of money being generated by drug trafficking have increased the threat for bribery. It is achallenge that INS, Customs, and other law enforcement agencies must overcome at the border. My testimony focuses on (1) the extent to which INS and Customs haveand comply with policies and procedures for ensuring employee integrity; (2) an identification and comparison of the Departments of Justice's andthe Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related employee misconduct and whether thepolicies and procedures are followed; (3) an identification of the types of illegal drug- related activities in which INS and Customs employees on theSouthwest Border have been convicted; 1 and (4) the extent to which lessons learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through1997 have led to changes in policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related corruption of INS and Customs employees. This statement is based on our March 30, 1999, report2 on drug- relatedemployee corruption. Our statement makes the following points: * INS' and Customs' compliance with their integrity procedures varied.* Justice's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and INS generally compliedwith investigative procedures, but Customs' compliance was uncertain. * Opportunities to learn lessons from closed corruption cases have beenmissed. Stretching 1,962 miles from Brownsville, TX, to Imperial Beach, CA, theSouthwest Border has been a long-standing transit area for illegal drugs entering the United States. According to the Department of State, theSouthwest Border is the principal transit route for cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine entering the United States. INS and Customs areprincipally responsible for stopping and seizing illegal drug shipments 1 In this report, if employees entered guilty pleas, we considered them to have been convicted of the crime. 2 Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption (GAO/GGD-99-31, Mar. 30, 1999). Background Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 4 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 across the Southwest Border. At the ports of entry, about 1,300 INS and2,000 Customs inspectors are to check incoming traffic to identify both persons and contraband that are not allowed to enter the country.Between the ports of entry and along thoroughfares in border areas, about 6,300 INS Border Patrol agents are to detect and prevent the illegal entry ofpersons and contraband. The corruption of INS or Customs employees is not a new phenomenon,and the 1990s have seen congressional emphasis on ensuring employee integrity and preventing corruption. A corrupt INS or Customs employee ator between the ports of entry can help facilitate the safe passage of illegal drug shipments. The integrity policies and procedures adopted by INS andCustoms are designed to ensure that their employees, especially those in positions that could affect the smuggling of illegal drugs into the UnitedStates, are of acceptable integrity and, failing that, to detect any corruption as quickly as possible. INS and Customs follow Office of Personnel Management (OPM)regulations, which require background investigations to be completed for new hires by the end of their first year on the job. Generally, thebackground investigations included a credit check, criminal record check, contact with prior employers and personal references, and an interviewwith the employee. Our review found that background investigations for over 99 percent of the immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, andCustoms inspectors hired during the first half of fiscal year 1997 were completed by the end of their first year on the job.3 OPM also requires immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, andCustoms inspectors to be reinvestigated at 5- year intervals from the date they enter on duty. The objective of these reinvestigations is to ensurethese employees' continuing suitability for their positions. As with background investigations, contractors did the reinvestigations and INSand Customs were responsible for making the final determinations on suitability. However, INS and Customs did not complete reinvestigationswithin the required 5-year time frame for over three-fourths of the selected Southwest Border personnel scheduled for reinvestigations in fiscal years 3 We restricted our analysis of immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents hired in fiscal year 1997 to those hired by March 8, 1997, and of Customs inspectors hired in fiscal year 1997 to those hiredby March 25, 1997. This is because we received personnel data current as of March 1998, the 1-year anniversaries of those dates, and because OPM allows agencies to employ individuals in a "subject toinvestigation" status for up to 1 year. A background investigation should be completed during that time. INS and CustomsGenerally Completed BackgroundInvestigations, but Not Reinvestigations, WhenDue Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 5 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 1995 through 1997. In some instances, reinvestigations were as many as 3years overdue. To the extent that a reinvestigation constitutes an important periodiccheck on an employee's continuing suitability for employment in a position where he or she may be exposed to bribery or other types of corruption,the continuing reinvestigation backlogs at both agencies leave them more vulnerable to potential employee corruption. As of March 1998, INS hadnot yet completed 513 overdue reinvestigations of immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents. Customs had a backlog of 421 overduereinvestigations. Newly hired immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customsinspectors are required to attend basic training. As part of their basic training, new employees are to receive training courses on integrityconcepts and expected behavior, including ethical concepts and values, ethical dilemmas and decisionmaking, and employee conductexpectations. This integrity training provides the only required integrity training for all immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customsinspectors. For Border Patrol agents, 7 of 744 basic training hours are to be devoted to integrity training. For Customs inspectors, 8 of 440 basictraining hours are to be devoted to integrity training. INS immigration inspectors are to receive integrity training as part of their basic training,but it is interspersed with other training rather than provided as a separate course. Therefore, we could not determine how many hours are to bedevoted specifically to integrity training. We selected random samples of 100 immigration inspectors, 101 BorderPatrol agents, and 100 Customs inspectors to determine whether they received integrity training as part of their basic training. Agency recordswe reviewed showed that 95 of 100 immigration inspectors, all 101 Border Patrol agents, and 88 of 100 Customs inspectors had received basictraining. According to INS and Customs officials, the remaining employees likely received basic training, but it was not documented in their records. Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials advocated advanced integritytraining for their employees to reinforce the integrity concepts presented during basic training.4 The Justice OIG, INS' Office of Internal Audit, andCustoms provide advanced integrity training for INS and Customs employees. 4 Advanced integrity training is any nonmanagerial integrity training provided to employees following completion of basic training. Basic Integrity TrainingWas Required and Advanced Training WasNot Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 6 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 While this advanced training has been available to immigration inspectors,Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors, they were not required to take it or any additional integrity training beyond what they received inbasic training. Consequently, some immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors assigned to the Southwest Border had notreceived any advanced integrity training in over 2 years. Based on a survey of random samples of immigration inspectors, BorderPatrol agents, and Customs inspectors assigned to the Southwest Border, we found that during fiscal years 1995 through 1997, 60 of 100 immigrationinspectors agents received no advanced integrity training. In addition, 60 of 76 Border Patrol agents received no advanced integrity training duringthe almost 2 1/2 - year period we examined. 5 The Customs survey indicated that 24 of 100 Customs inspectors received no advanced integrity trainingduring this period. The Departments of Justice and the Treasury have established proceduresfor handling allegations of employee misconduct. Misconduct allegations arise from numerous sources, including confidential informants,cooperating witnesses, anonymous tipsters, and whistle-blowers. For example, whistle-blowers can report alleged misconduct through theagencies' procedures for reporting any suspected wrongdoing. INS and Customs have policies that require employees to report suspectedwrongdoing. We selected five Justice OIG procedures to evaluate compliance with theprocessing of employee misconduct allegations. In a majority of the cases we reviewed, the Justice OIG complied with its procedures for receiving,investigating, and resolving drug- related employee misconduct allegations. For example, monthly interim reports were prepared as required in 28 of39 opened cases we reviewed. In the remaining 11 cases, either some information was missing in interim reports or there were no interimreports in the case file. INS' Office of Internal Audit complied with its procedures for receivingand resolving employee misconduct allegations in all of its cases. 5 INS did not provide us with requested training data for 25 of the 101 Border Patrol agents in our sample. Justice OIG and INSGenerally Complied with InvestigativeProcedures, but Customs' ComplianceWas Uncertain Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 7 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Because Customs' Office of Internal Affairs' automated case managementsystem did not track adherence to Customs' processing requirements, we could not readily determine if the Office of Internal Affairs staff compliedwith their investigative procedures. Customs' automated system is the official investigative record. It tracksand categorizes misconduct allegations and resulting investigations and disciplinary action. The investigative case files are to support theautomated system in tracking criminal investigative activity and contain such information as printed records from the automated system, copies ofsubpoenas and arrest warrants, and a chronology of investigative events. Based on these content criteria and our file reviews, the investigative casefiles are not intended to and generally do not document the adherence to processing procedures. Our analysis of the 28 closed cases revealed that drug-related corruption inthese cases was not restricted to any one type, location, agency, or job. Corruption occurred in many locations and under various circumstancesand times, underscoring the need for comprehensive integrity procedures that are effective. The cases also represented an opportunity to identifyinternal control weaknesses. The 28 INS and Customs employees engaged in one or more drug- relatedcriminal activities, including * waving drug-laden vehicles through ports of entry, * coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border, * transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, * selling drugs, and * disclosing drug intelligence information. The 28 convicted employees (19 INS employees and 9 Customs employees)were stationed at various locations on the Southwest Border. Six each were stationed in El Paso, TX, and Calexico, CA; four were stationed inDouglas, AZ; three were stationed in San Ysidro, CA; two each were stationed in Hidalgo, TX, and Los Fresnos, TX; and one each was stationedin Naco, AZ, Chula Vista, CA, Bayview, TX, Harlingen, TX, and Falfurrias, TX. Opportunities to LearnLessons from Closed Corruption Cases HaveBeen Missed Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 8 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 The 28 INS and Customs employees who were convicted for drug-relatedcrimes included 10 immigration inspectors, 7 Customs inspectors, 6 Border Patrol agents, 3 INS Detention Enforcement Officers (DEO), 1 Customscanine enforcement officer, and 1 Customs operational analysis specialist. All but the three had anti-drug smuggling responsibilities. Twenty-six ofthe convicted employees were men; 2 were women. The employment histories of the convicted employees varied substantially. In 19 cases, the employees acted alone, that is, no other INS or Customsemployees were involved in the drug-related criminal activity. In the remaining nine cases, two or more INS and/or Customs employees actedtogether. Of the 28 cases, 23 originated from information provided by confidential informants or cooperating witnesses, and 5 cases originatedfrom information provided by agency whistle-blowers. Prison sentences for the convicted employees ranged from 30 days, for disclosure ofconfidential information, to life imprisonment for drug conspiracy, money laundering, and bribery. The average sentence was about 10 years.6 Both the Justice OIG and Customs procedures require them to formallyreport internal control weaknesses identified during investigations, including drug-related corruption investigations involving INS andCustoms employees. Generally, the Justice OIG and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs, respectively, have lead responsibility for investigatingcriminal allegations involving INS and Customs employees. Reports of internal control weaknesses are to identify any lessons to be learned thatcan be used to prevent further employee corruption. The reports are to be forwarded to agency officials who are responsible for taking correctiveaction. Reports are not required if no internal control weaknesses are identified. In the 28 cases involving INS or Customs employees who were convictedfor drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997, no reports were prepared. We concluded from this that either (1) there were no internalcontrol weaknesses revealed by, or lessons to be learned from, these corruption cases or (2) opportunities to identify and correct internalcontrol weaknesses have been missed, and thus INS' and Customs' vulnerability to employee corruption has not been reduced. 6 The average prison sentence calculation does not include two former employees sentenced to life imprisonment, and one former employee who fled the country prior to sentencing. Information isprovided only on the imprisonment portion of the sentences. Drug-Related CorruptionCases Were Not Used to Learn Lessons Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 9 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Justice's OIG investigated 13 of the 28 cases. The investigative files did notdocument whether procedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses. Further, there were no reports identifying internal controlweaknesses. According to a Justice OIG official, no reports are required if no weaknesses are identified, and he could not determine why reportswere not prepared in these cases. Customs' Office of Internal Affairs' Internal Affairs Handbook provides forthe preparation of a procedural deficiency report in those internal investigations where there was a significant failure that resulted from (1)failure to follow an established procedure, (2) lack of an established procedure, or (3) conflicting or obsolete procedures. The report is to detailthe causal factors and scope of the deficiency. We identified eight cases involving Customs employees investigated byCustoms' Office of Internal Affairs. No procedural deficiency reports were prepared in these cases. Further, the investigative files did not documentwhether internal control weaknesses were identified. A Customs official said the reports are generally not prepared. Although the Justice OIG and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs have leadresponsibility for investigating allegations involving INS and Customs employees, the FBI is authorized to investigate INS or Customs employees.Of the 28 cases, the FBI investigated 7, involving 6 INS employees and 1 Customs employee. Under current procedures, the FBI is not required toprovide the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs with case information that would allow them to identify internal control weaknesses,where the FBI investigation involves an INS or Customs employee. In addition, while Attorney General memorandums require the FBI to identifyand report any internal control weaknesses identified during white-collar or health care fraud investigations, a Justice Department official told usthat these reporting requirements do not apply to drug-related corruption cases. According to FBI officials, no reports were prepared in the sevencases because they were not required. The Justice OIG and Customs did not identify and report any internalcontrol weaknesses involving the procedures that were followed at the ports of entry and at Border Patrol checkpoints along the SouthwestBorder. Our review of the same cases identified several weaknesses. We identified 14 cases in which INS or Customs inspectors knowinglypassed drug-laden vehicles through ports of entry. Traditionally, INS and Customs have relied on internal controls to minimize this type of Our Review of ClosedCorruption Cases Revealed Internal ControlWeaknesses on the Southwest Border Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 10 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 corruption. These have included the random assignment and shifting ofinspectors from one lane to another and the unannounced inspection of a group of vehicles. However, in the cases we reviewed, these internalcontrols did not prevent corrupt INS and Customs personnel from allowing drug-laden vehicles to enter the United States. In some cases, theinspectors communicated their lane assignment and the time they would be on duty to the drug smuggler, and in other cases, they did not. In onecase, for example, an inspector used a cellular telephone to send a prearranged code to a drug smuggler's beeper to tell him which lane to useand what time to use it. In contrast, another inspector did not notify the drug smuggler concerning his lane assignment or the times he would be onduty. In that case, the drug smuggler used an individual, referred to as a spotter, to conduct surveillance of the port of entry. The spotter used acellular telephone to contact the driver of the drug-laden vehicle to tell him which lane to drive through. The drug smugglers' schemes succeeded in these cases because the driversof the drug-laden vehicles could choose the lane they wanted to use for inspection purposes. These cases support the implementation of one ormore methods to deprive drivers of their choice of inspection lanes at ports of entry. At the time of our review, Customs was testing a method toassign drivers to inspection lanes at ports of entry. In 10 of 28 cases, drug smugglers relied on friendships, personalrelationships, or symbols of law enforcement authority to move drug loads through a port of entry or past a Border Patrol checkpoint. In these 10cases, drug smugglers believed that coworkers, relatives, and friends of Customs or immigration inspectors, or law enforcement officials, wouldnot be inspected or would be given preferential treatment in the inspection process. For example, a Border Patrol agent relied on his friendships withhis coworkers to avoid inspection at a Border Patrol checkpoint where he was stationed. In another case, an inspector agreed to allow her boyfriendto smuggle drugs through a port of entry. The boyfriend used his personal and intimate relationship with the inspector to solicit drug shipments fromdrug dealers. Two DEOs working together used INS detention buses and vans to transport drugs past a Border Patrol checkpoint. In two separatecases, former INS employees relied on friendships they had developed during their tenure with the agency to smuggle drugs through ports ofentry and past Border Patrol checkpoints. INS and Customs do not have written recusal policies concerning theperformance of inspections where the relationship of immigration or Customs inspectors and Border Patrol agents to the person being Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 11 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 inspected is such that they may not objectively perform the inspection.Nor do they have a written inspection policy for law enforcement officers or their vehicles. For example, our review of the cases determined that, onnumerous occasions, INS DEOs drove INS vehicles with drug loads past Border Patrol checkpoints without being inspected. INS and Customs have not evaluated the effectiveness of their integrityassurance procedures to identify areas that could be improved. According to Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials, agency integrity procedureshave not been evaluated to determine if they are effective. The Acting Deputy Commissioner of Customs said that there were no evaluations ofthe effectiveness of Customs integrity procedures. Similarly, officials in INS' Offices of Internal Audit and Personnel Security said that there wereno evaluations of the effectiveness of INS' integrity procedures. According to the Justice Inspector General, virtually no work had been done toreview closed corruption cases or interview convicted employees to identify areas of vulnerability. Based on our review, one way to evaluate the effectiveness of agencyintegrity procedures would be to use drug-related investigative case information. For example, the objective of background investigations orreinvestigations is to determine an individual's suitability for employment, including whether he or she has the required integrity. All 28 of the INSand Customs employees who were convicted for drug-related crimes received background investigations or reinvestigations that determinedthey were suitable. According to INS and Customs security officials, financial information, required to be provided by employees as part oftheir background investigations or reinvestigations, is to be used to determine whether they appear to be living beyond their means, or haveunsatisfied debts. If either of these issues arises, it must be satisfactorily resolved before INS or Customs can determine that the employee issuitable. In addition, Justice policy provides for the temporary removal of immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents if they are unable and/orunwilling to satisfy their debts. 7 Our review of background investigation and reinvestigation files forconvicted INS employees showed that immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents were required to provide limited financial information onliabilities, including bankruptcies, wage garnishment, property repossession, and liens for taxes or other debts or judgements that have 7 Justice Department policy defines debt as "lawful financial obligations that are just debts that are past due." INS and Customs Have NotEvaluated Their Integrity Procedures Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 12 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 not been paid.8 They were not required to provide information on theirassets. In comparison, Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers were required to provide information on both their assets andliabilities, including financial information for themselves and their immediate families on their bank accounts, automobiles, real estate,securities, safe deposit boxes, business investments, art, boats, antiques, inheritance, mortgage, and debts and obligations exceeding $200.9 Our review of the 28 cases involving convicted INS and Customsemployees disclosed that 26 of 28 employees were offered or received financial remuneration for their illegal acts. At least two were substantiallyindebted, and at least four were shown to be living beyond their means. For example, one of the closed cases we reviewed involved an immigrationinspector who said he became involved with a drug smuggler because he had substantial credit card debt and was on the verge of bankruptcy. Giventhe limited financial information immigration inspectors are required to provide, this inspector might not have been identified as a potential risk. Inanother case, a mid-level Border Patrol agent owned a house valued at approximately $200,000, an Olympic-sized swimming pool in its ownseparate building, a 5-car garage, 5 automobiles, 1 van, 2 boats, approximately 100 weapons, $45,000 in treasury bills, 40 acres of land, andhad no debt. Given the current background investigation or reinvestigation financial reporting requirements for Border Patrol agents, this agent wouldnot have had anything to report, since he was not required to report his assets, and he had no debts to report. Our review of Customs files for eight of the nine convicted Customsemployees showed that the Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers had completed financial disclosure statements that included theirassets and liabilities as part of their employee background investigations and reinvestigations. However, based on our case file review, Customsdoes not fully use all of the financial information. For example, according to a Customs official, reported liabilities are to be compared with debtslisted on a credit report to determine if all debts were reported. Thus, their current use of the reported financial information would not have helped toidentify an employee who was living well beyond his means or whose debts were excessive. 8 Immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents are to complete a Questionnaire for National Security Positions as part of their background investigation and reinvestigation. 9 Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers are to complete a Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions and a Financial Statement on Customs Form 257 as part of their background investigationand reinvestigation. Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 13 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Another source of evaluative information for INS and Customs could bethe experiences of other federal agencies with integrity prevention and detection policies and procedures. For example, while INS' and Customs'procedures were similar to those used by other federal law enforcement agencies, several differences exist. According to agency officials, INS andCustoms did not require advanced integrity training, polygraph examinations, or panel interviews before hiring, while the FBI, DEA, andSecret Service did have these requirements. Among the five agencies, only DEA required new employees to be assigned to a mentor to reinforceagency values and procedures. Since these policies and procedures are used by other agencies, they may be applicable to INS and Customs. During our review, the Justice OIG, INS, the Treasury OIG, and Customsbegan to review their anticorruption efforts. These efforts have not been completed, and it is too early to determine what their outcomes will be. Given the enormous sums of money being generated by drug traffickingand the corruption of some INS and Customs employees along the Southwest Border, both INS and Customs are vulnerable to the threat ofcorruption. Accordingly, we recommended that the Attorney General * direct the Commissioner of INS to evaluate the effectiveness of integrityassurance efforts, such as training, background investigations, and reinvestigations; * require the Commissioner of INS to comply with policies that requireemployment reinvestigations to be completed when they are due; * direct the Commissioner of INS to strengthen internal controls atSouthwest Border ports of entry and at Border Patrol checkpoints by establishing (1) one or more methods to deprive drivers of their choice ofinspection lanes at ports of entry; (2) a policy for the inspection of law enforcement officers or their vehicles at ports of entry and Border Patrolcheckpoints; and (3) a recusal policy concerning the performance of inspections by immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents wheretheir objectivity may be in question; * direct the Commissioner of INS to require Border Patrol agents andimmigration inspectors to file financial disclosure statements, including a listing of their assets and liabilities, as part of the background investigationor reinvestigation process, as well as fully review this information to identify financial issues, such as employees who appear to be livingbeyond their means; Recommendations Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 14 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 * require the Justice OIG to document that policies and procedures werereviewed to identify internal control weaknesses in cases where an INS employee is determined to have engaged in drug-related criminal activities;and * require the Director of the FBI to develop a procedure to provideinformation from closed FBI cases, involving INS or Customs employees, to the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs so they canidentify and report internal control weaknesses to the responsible agency official. The procedure should apply in those cases where (1) the JusticeOIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs was not involved in the investigation, (2) the subject of the investigation was an INS or Customsemployee, and (3) the employee was convicted of a drug-related crime. We also recommended that the Secretary of the Treasury * direct the Commissioner of Customs to evaluate the effectiveness ofintegrity assurance efforts, including training, background investigations, and reinvestigations; * require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with policies that requireemployment reinvestigations to be completed when they are due; * require the Commissioner of Customs to document that policies andprocedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses, in cases where a Customs employee is determined to have engaged drug- related criminal activities; * require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with the policies thatrequire employment reinvestigations to be completed when they are due; * require the Commissioner of Customs to document that policies andprocedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses in cases where a Customs employee is determined to have engaged in drug- relatedcriminal activities; * direct the Commissioner of Customs to strengthen internal controls atSouthwest Border ports of entry by establishing (1) one or more methods to deprive drivers of their choice of inspection lanes; (2) a policy forinspection of law enforcement officers and their vehicles; and (3) a recusal policy concerning the performance of inspections by Customs inspectorswhere their objectivity may be in question; and Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 15 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 * require that Customs fully review financial disclosure statements, whichemployees are required to provide as part of the background investigation or reinvestigation process, to identify financial issues, such as employeeswho appear to be living beyond their means. The Department of Justice generally agreed with the substance of thereport and recognized the importance of taking all possible actions to reduce the potential for corruption. However, Justice expressedreservations about implementing two of the six recommendations addressed to the Attorney General. First, Justice expressed reservations about implementing ourrecommendation that Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors file financial disclosure statements as part of their background investigationsor reinvestigations. Specifically, it noted that implementing financial disclosure "has obstacles to be met and at present the DOJ has limited datato suggest that they would provide better data or greater assurance of a person's integrity." We recognized that implementation of this recommendation will requiresome administrative actions by INS. However, these actions are consistent with the routine management practices associated with making policychanges within the agency. Therefore, the obstacles do not appear to be inordinate or insurmountable. Concerning the limited data about thebenefits of financial reporting, according to OPM officials and the adjudication manual for background investigations and reinvestigations,financial information can have a direct bearing and impact on determining an individual's integrity. The circumstances described in our case studiessuggest that financial reporting could have raised issues for follow-up during a background investigation or reinvestigation. We recognize thatthere may be questions on the effectiveness of this procedure; therefore, this report contains a recommendation for an overall evaluation of INS'integrity assurance efforts. Secondly, Justice expressed reservations about implementing ourrecommendation that the FBI develop a procedure to provide information to the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs on internal controlweaknesses. Therefore, we clarified our recommendation to indicate that the procedure should only apply in those cases where (1) the Justice OIGor Customs' Office of Internal Affairs was not involved in the investigation, (2) the subject of the investigation was an INS or Customs employee, and(3) the employee was convicted of a drug-related crime. If internal control weaknesses in INS or Customs are known to the FBI and not disclosed to Agencies' Commentson Our Report Statement Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption Page 16 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 those agencies, then the agencies are not in the best position to correct theabuses. The Department of the Treasury provided comments from Customs thatgenerally concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it is taking steps to implement them. However, Customs requested that wereconsider our recommendation that Customs fully review financial disclosure statements that are provided as part of the background andreinvestigation process. Our recommendation expected Customs to make a more thorough examination of the financial information it collects todetermine if employees appear to be living beyond their means. We leave it to Customs' discretion to determine the type of examination to beperformed. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleasedto answer any questions that you or other Members of the Caucus may have. Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additionalcopies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to theSuperintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or morecopies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 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